U.S. Trade Law And Imported Farmed Atlantic Salmon: Protectionism Or Protection Of Free Trade by Peterson, Mark T.
Ocean and Coastal Law Journal
Volume 2 | Number 1 Article 3
January 1996
U.S. Trade Law And Imported Farmed Atlantic
Salmon: Protectionism Or Protection Of Free
Trade
Mark T. Peterson
University of Maine School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Ocean and Coastal Law Journal by an authorized administrator of University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark T. Peterson, U.S. Trade Law And Imported Farmed Atlantic Salmon: Protectionism Or Protection Of Free Trade, 2 Ocean & Coastal
L.J. (1996).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj/vol2/iss1/3
U.S. TRADE LAW AND IMPORTED FARMED
ATLANTIC SALMON:
PROTECTIONISM OR PROTECTION
OF FREE TRADE?
Mark T Petersons
I. INTRODUCTION
International trade in fishery products is becoming increasingly
important. This is evidenced by the number of international disputes
concerning fishery products. Conflicts have arisen between the environ-
ment and fish trade, as was the case in the U.S.-Mexican tuna-dolphin
dispute.' Disputes have arisen over import regulations.' Disputes have
* Master of Arts and Marine Affairs 1995, University of Rhode Island; University
of Maine School of Law, Class of 1998.
1. Much has been written on this subject. See, e.g., Ted L. McDorman, The
GAT Consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save
Whales, Dolphins and Turtles, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 477, 508 (1991)
(suggesting the U.S. might be able to project its conservation agenda internationally using
other international treaties besides trade agreements); Hon. R. Kenton Musgrove and
Garland Stephens, The GATT-Tuna Dolphin Dispute: An Update, 33 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 957 (1993); Stanley M. Spracker and David C. Lundsgaard, Dolphins and Tuna:
Renewed Attention on the Future of Free Trade and Protection of the Environment, 18
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 385 (1993); Thomas E. Skilton, GAT and the Environment in
Conflict: The Tuna-Dolphin Dispute and the Quest for an International Conservation
Strategy, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 455 (1993).
2. See February Council: "Other Business," GATT Focus NEWSL., Mar./Apr.
1994, at 3 (detailing U.S. complaint concerning French whitefish import restrictions);
Ted L. McDorman, Dissecting the Free Trade Agreement Lobster Panel Decision, 18
CAN. Bus. L.J. 445 (1991); Gail Peabody, The Lobster Size Conflict: Use of United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Dispute Resolution Procedures, 1 TERR. SEA J.
273 (1991) (examining dispute between the U.S. and Canada over the minimum lobster
size that Canada could export into the U.S.); Panel Established on Scallops, WTO Focus
NEWSL., Aug./Sept. 1995, at 4 (detailing Canadian complaint to GATT about French
scallop labeling requirements).
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also developed over the management of fishery resources within a state's
200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone. One such disagreement,
between the United States and Canada, concerned wild salmon and
herring processing regulations.3
The United States is one of the most important seafood trading
countries in the world. This importance is illustrated by the fact that the
United States was the world's second largest importer of seafood
products in 1991, importing some $6 billion worth, and the world's
largest exporter of seafood products, exporting $3.5 billion worth.' As
the significance of seafood grows, and existing fisheries become
depleted, the possibility for conflict between the United States and other
seafood trading countries grows. International trade law and practice is
a factor materially influencing world fishery production and trade, a
better understanding of which is important to help avoid future costly
dispute settlement.
One of the fish stocks important to the seafood trade of the United
States is salmon. U.S. consumers consumed an average of 1.162 pounds
of salmon in 1992, making it the fourth most popular seafood that year.'
In 1993, the average American consumed 15 pounds of seafood, 0.99
pounds of which was salmon, the fifth most popular U.S. seafood.6 The
numbers for 1994 were essentially the same.7 The majority of salmon
3. Ted L. McDorman, International Trade Law Meets International Fisheries Law:
The Canada-U.S. Salmon and Herring Dispute, 7 J. INT'L ARB. 107 (1990).
4. Commodities 1991, 73 U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. Y.B. 91 (1993) (chart entitled
"Imports and Exports by Country and by Seven Fishery Commodity Groups").
5. America's Top 10 Seafoods, SEAFOOD Bus., Sept./Oct. 1993, at 35. Salmon
moved up from the number five position it held in 1991. The top three were (in order,
according to average edible weight consumed): tuna, 3.5 lbs.; shrimp, 2.5 lbs.; and
Alaska pollock, 1.23 lbs. Id.
6. Seafood's Top Ten, NAT'L FIsHERMAN, Oct. 1994, at 50. Although a large
portion of this was wild Pacific salmon, farmed Atlantic salmon has become increasingly
important, especially on the East coast. The remainder of the top ten, with rank and
edible weight (pounds) consumed were: 1) tuna, 3.5; 2) shrimp, 2.5; 3) Alaska pollock,
1.2; 4) cod, 1.0; 6) catfish, 0.98; 7) flatfish, 0.6; 8) clams, 0.5; 9) crab, 0.3; 10)
scallops, 0.2. Id. (figures obtained from the National Fisheries Institute).
7. Tuna, Shrimp, Pollock are Tops in Seafood, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 9,
1995, at D5. The top ten with edible weight (pounds) consumed were: 1) tuna, 3.3; 2)
shrimp, 2.6; 3) Alaska pollock, 1.5; 4) salmon, 1.1; 5) cod, 0.9; 6) catfish, 0.8; 7)
clams, 0.5; 8) flatfish, 0.36; 9) crabs, 0.31; 10) scallops, 0.29. Id. (figures obtained
from the National Fisheries Institute). See also Joanna Ramey, Seafood Consumption
Reaches Record Levels According to National Fisheries Institute Annual Review,
SUPERMARKET Nnws, Sept. 4, 1995, at 13.
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farmed in the United States comes from Maine.8 Maine salmon farmers
contended with stiff competition from imported Norwegian farmed
Atlantic salmon until 1989.1
In 1990, twenty-one Maine and Washington Atlantic salmon
producers formed the Coalition for Fair Atlantic Salmon Trade (FAST),
and filed a petition with the U.S. International Trade Commission
(USITC) and the U.S. International Trade Administration (USITA) to
complain about alleged subsidizing of the Norwegian Atlantic salmon
farming industry by the Norwegian government. The petition also
alleged that Norwegian Atlantic salmon was being sold at less than fair
value in the United States and that this practice was harming the U.S.
salmon industry."° During its subsequent investigation, the USITA found
that the subject imports were being subsidized and were being sold at less
than fair value in the United States. The USITC found that these imports
were materially injuring the domestic Atlantic salmon farming industry.
Therefore, countervailing and antidumping duties were imposed on
Norwegian imports of fresh and chilled farmed Atlantic salmon.
Norway then appealed these determinations to the U.S. Court of
International Trade. This Court determined that the USITC had not
properly evaluated a decline in Norwegian imports in 1990. The Court
also felt that there was not sufficient evidence to support the USITC
determination of injury to the U.S. industry at the time of its final
determination. The Court reversed and remanded the final USITC
determination because of these deficiencies.
The Court of International Trade's decision forced the USITC to
reevaluate and justify its earlier determination of injury. On reconsidera-
tion, the USITC found that other factors, namely, the appreciation of the
8. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, NOAA, Tech. Memo. NMFS-F/SPO-3,
WoRLD SALMON CULTuRE 320-321 (1992). In 1991, Maine harvested 4,704 metric tons
(mt.) of farmed Atlantic salmon, worth $29,970,392; Washington State harvested 1,980
mt. of farmed Atlantic salmon, and 210 mt. of farmed Pacific salmon. 1d.
9. Id. at 318.
10. Mark L. Hennann et al., Consequences of Tariffs Placed on Norwegian Farmed
Atlantic Salmon by the United States and the EEC, SALMON MARKET NEWSL., Sept.
1990, at 1. Atlantic salmon growers from Washington State later, on March 16, 1991,
withdrew support for the action, but did not necessarily oppose the action, Committee on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, United States-Imposition of Countervailing
Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway: Report of the
Panel, GATT at 34, GATT Doe. SCM/153 (1992) [hereinafter SCM/153]. See also
infra Section ]I(A).
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Norwegian kroner to the U.S. dollar, an increase in exports to the
European Community," and one exporter's decrease in exports to the
United States, did not account for the decline in subject imports, but that
the initiation of its preliminary investigations did. The USITC also
explained that it had utilized 1989 import data instead of 1990 data when
determining present injury, because the later data would have reflected
the reduction in Norwegian imports to the United States resulting from
the imposition of the duties.
When Norway appealed the final determinations of the USITC and
imposition of duties by the USITA to the U.S. Court of International
Trade, it also petitioned the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) to establish two panels, one to review the U.S. imposition of
countervailing duties, the other to look into the U.S. imposition of
antidumping duties. GATT agreed to establish the two panels, which
each then heard the arguments of the two parties and rendered a
decision.
The GATT Panel considering the countervailing duty agreed with the
United States on all points. The Panel agreed with the determination of
the United States, not because its methods had been prescribed by the
text of GATT and its side agreements, but because there was no
prescribed methodology in the Agreement to use in determining the
existence of a subsidy, or in defining what types of programs were
countervailable. The United States' determination of injury was found
acceptable in the absence of such explicit criteria, because the United
States had explained why it had used 1989 data to determine present
injury and not 1990 data. Thus, the lack of a prescribed methodology
worked in the favor of the United States.
The Panel examining the antidumping duty determination did not
wholly agree with the United States. Although the Panel agreed with
most of the U.S. practices in the case, it felt the United States had not
properly obtained a representative sample of Norwegian salmon farms in
determining the relevant cost of production. However, the Panel did not
therefore find that the general determination and imposition of duties by
the United States was inconsistent with its international obligations. This
conclusion was again reached generally because there had not been a
prescribed methodology in the GATT. Since the United States had at
least considered alternative factors affecting the U.S. industry, and had
11. Now the European Union (EU).
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justified why it used the information it had, U.S. practice was found to
be compatible with its international obligations.
This dispute, as examined in this article, provides a case study of
U.S. international trade law and practice and its compatibility with the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The study is designed to
answer four primary questions: 1) is U.S. trade law being used as a
protectionist measure to protect U.S. industries from unfair foreign
competition; 2) is U.S. practice incompatible with international trade
law; 3) did the removal of Norwegian Atlantic salmon from the U.S.
market open the door for other producer countries; and, 4) was the above
opportunity capitalized on by Maine, the initiator of the investigations,
or by other producer countries, namely Canada and Chile? Before
addressing these questions in light of the U.S.-Norway dispute, the next
section will provide some general legal background.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. U.S. Countervailing Duty and Antidumping Duty Provisions
The imposition of countervailing and antidumping duties on imports
into the United States is governed by Title 19, Subtitle IV of the U.S.
Code. According to these provisions, if it is determined that certain
countries 2 or their nationals are providing subsidies to export industries
and that those subsidized imports are 1) materially injuring a U.S.
industry or 2) threatening a U.S. industry with such injury, a counter-
vailing duty is to be imposed on the import in question which shall be
equal to the net subsidy.13 In addition, if a class or kind of foreign
merchandise being sold in the United States is sold at less than fair value
(LTFV) and such activity is 1) materially injuring a U.S. industry or 2)
threatening a U.S. industry with such injury, an antidumping duty, in an
amount equal to the amount by which the foreign market value exceeds
the U.S. price for the merchandise, is to be imposed on that merchan-
dise.'4
The authorities which administer these countervailing duty and
antidumping duty provisions are the U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion (USITC) and the U.S. International Trade Administration
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b) (1994).
13. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1994).
14. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1994).
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(USITA). 15 The USITC is "an independent, nonpartisan, quasi-judicial
federal agency that provides trade expertise to both the legislative and
executive branches of government, determines the impact of imports on
U.S. industries, and directs actions against certain unfair trade practices
involving patents, trademarks, and copyrights. [US]ITC analysts and
economists investigate and publish reports on U.S. industries and the
global trends that affect them."16 The USITC was first established by
Congress in 1916 as the U.S. Tariff Commission,"' but its name was
changed to the U.S. International Trade Commission by section 171 of
the Trade Act of 1974."8
The USITC acts in two primary capacities. The first is in a quasi-
judicial capacity. It is acting in such a capacity when it determines
whether certain imports injure or threaten to injure U.S. industry. 9
USITC's second role is as the government's think tank on trade. It
fulfills this role by collecting and analyzing trade data.'
The U.S. International Trade Administration is part of the Depart-
ment of Commerce. The USITA was established on January 2, 1980 by
the Secretary of Commerce to "promote world trade and to strengthen
the international trade and investment position of the United States."2
15. When commencing either a countervailing or antidumping duty proceeding, the
petitioner must simultaneously file with both the "administering authority" and the
"Commission." 19 USCS §§ 1671a(b), 1673a(b). 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1) defines the term
"administering authority" as "the Secretary of the Treasury, or any other officer of the
United States to whom the responsibility for carrying out the duties of the administering
authority under this subtitle are transferred by law." In 1980, President Carter
transferred this responsibility to the Department of Commerce. The USITA is a part of
this Department. See Alexander Manganiello, The Roles of the International Trade
Administration and the International Trade Commission in Countervailing Duty
Determinations, 16 SUFFOLK TRANSN'L L.R. 571, 578 (1993). 19 U.S.C. § 1677(2)
defines the term "Commission" as the United States International Trade Commission.
16. UNITED STATES INT'L TRADE COMM'N, USITC PUB. No. 2784, ANNUAL
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 1993 (1993) [hereinafter USITC PUB. 2784] (inside cover).
17. OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES INT'L TRADE COMM'N, USITC
PAMPHLET No. OPA 994, U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N 1 (1994).
18. OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1994/1995 758 (1994).
Six Commissioners, nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, head the
USITC. USITC OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 17, at 2. The Commissioners
serve for nine year terms, with a new term beginning every eighteen months. Id.
19. USITC PUB. 2784, supra note 16, at 5.
20. Id.
21. OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, supra note 18, at 166.
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The Under Secretary for International Trade determines the organiza-
tion's policy and coordinates and directs its programs and other
activities. '
The Import Administration, a division of the USITA, is also
involved in antidumping and countervailing duty determinations. The
primary function of the Import Administration is to protect U.S. industry
from unfair trade practices. The Import Administration accomplishes
this "by administering efficiently, fairly, and in a manner consistent with
U.S. international trade obligations the antidumping and countervailing
duty laws of the United States."' The Import Administration is a major
force leading existing federal efforts to improve the GATI antidumping
code.2
The USITC and USITA work together in antidumping and counter-
vailing duty determination cases. During preliminary duty determina-
tions, the USITC determines whether there is a reasonable indication that
a U.S. industry is being materially injured or threatened by material
injury because of the imports which are the subject of the investigation.'
The USITA then has to determine whether there is a reasonable
indication that a subsidy is being provided to the subject importers or
whether the subject imports are being sold at LTFV in the United States,
and if so, by how much.26 During final determinations, the USITC and
USITA finalize their preliminary determinations.'
The relationship between preliminary and final determinations is that
preliminary determinations determine whether there are reasonable
indications that a subsidy is involved, or that imports are being sold at
less than fair value. A preliminary determination focuses on whether
there is a reasonable indication that injury to an industry in the United
States has occurred or is likely to result from the subject imports. A
final determination determines whether a subsidy is actually being given
and/or whether the subject imports are actually being sold at LTFV. It
22. Int'l Trade Admin.; Organization and Assignment of Functions, 45 Fed. Reg.
6148 (1980).
23. OFFICE OF TI FEDERAL REGISTER, supra note 18, at 166. Although not
discussed extensively in the paper, the Import Administration conducted the investigation
for the USITA in the Norway-U.S. salmon dispute.
24. 45 Fed. Reg. at 6150-51.
25. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b(a), 1673b(a) (1994).
26. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b(b), 1673b(b) (1994).
27. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d, 1673d (1994). See also Manganiello, supra note 15.
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contains a finding as to whether material injury is or is not, in fact,
threatening a U.S. industry. The final investigation, thus, is an elabora-
tion of the preliminary investigation.
B. International Trade Law and Practice:
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI)
1. Development of GAIT
After World War II, a few major countries, primarily the United
States, United Kingdom, and France, started negotiations to form the
International Trade Organization (ITO).' The ITO was to be an
international agreement designed to address postwar protectionist trade
controls in an orderly fashion." GATT is all that remains of the early
ITO negotiation efforts. GATT was initially meant only to be a
temporary multinational trade agreement, one of the first, that was to
later be incorporated into the ITO.' GATT's charter was signed by
twenty-three governments on October 30, 1947.31 It entered into force
on January 1, 1948.32
Hope that the ITO would become a specialized agency of the United
Nations faded in 1950 when the United States refused to ratify its
28. The ITO, along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank or IBRD), were all
part of the system created at Bretton Woods. The hope was to initiate a new world
order. Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for
World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349, 352 (1995).
29. ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE
DIPLOMACY 5-7 (2d ed. 1990). See this reference for a comprehensive discussion of the
International Trade Organization and GATT negotiations, outcomes, and the emergence
of GATT. See also KENNETH W. DAM, THE GAIT: LAW AND INT'L ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION (1970); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT
(1969); OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE
SYSTEM (1985). For a discussion of the Uruguay Round and its results, see JEFFREY J.
SCHOTT & JOHANNA W. BuURMAN, THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT (1994).
30. HUDEC, supra note 29, at 50-51.
31. Id. at 50.
32. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, TEXT OF THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATI) preface, GATT Sales No. GATr/1986-4
(1986). Unless otherwise stated, all references to various Articles and provisions of
GATT are from this source.
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charter.33 This is when GATT emerged as an informal international
body.' It was not until ten years later that GATT started to take on a
more permanent organizational structure.35
During the first decade of GATT's existence, it handled issues on an
ad hoe basis. After 1958, changing economic conditions required GATT
to fulfill a role which exceeded its original mandate.36 These changes
can be attributed to the changing membership of GATT. The post-1958
world saw the emergence of the less developed countries and their
agendas, Japan's rapid growth, and the formation of the European
Economic CommunityY By the mid-1960s, GATT had transformed into
a large, bureaucratic international organization.38 In 1992, GATT was
a binding agreement on 105 countries which together accounted for
approximately 90 percent of the world trade in merchandise. The
Agreement was also applied by an additional 27 countries on a de facto
basis and numerous countries and international organizations had
observer status.39 The latest round of negotiations, the Uruguay Round,
took seven years. The fruits of the negotiations were adopted in April
1994.1 The Uruguay Round resulted in the most comprehensive set of
international trade agreements to date.4'
33. HUDEC, supra note 29, at 59-61. Although the ITO was to be a specialized
agency of the UN, GATT never was, and is not today. Since the adoption of the
Uruguay Round negotiations in 1994 the GAIT has been part of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). ScHOTT & BUuRMAN, supra note 29, at 14. The WTO acts as
an administrative body that unifies the new and existing GATT/WTO obligations.
Dillon, supra note 28, at 355-73.
34. AMERICAN TARiFFS LEAGUE, THE STORY BEIEND GATT: FACTS ABouT THE
GENERAL AGRBEmENT ON TARiFFS AND TRADE AND THE ORGANIZATION FOR TRADE
COOPERATION 20-21 (1955); HUDEC, supra note 29, at 67.
35. HUDEC, supra note 29, at 209.
36. Id. at 209.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. GENERAL AGREEmNT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, GATT: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT
IT DoEs 1-4 (1992).
40. ScoTT & BuuRmAN, supra note 29, at 3. Talks began in September 1986 at
Punta del Este, Uruguay (source of "Uruguay Round" designation), and ended in late
1993. Id. The WTO and its Agreements entered into force on January 2, 1995. Dillon,
supra note 28, at 349 n.*.
41. Because the dispute discussed in this article was initiated before the Uruguay
Round was completed, these negotiations will be referred to only to note some of the
differences between the old agreements and the new ones.
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2. Settling Disputes Under GATP2
The GATT has not always used panels to settle disputes, nor does
the text of the GATr mention their use.43 The use of panels has evolved
through custom." Initially, disputes were resolved by a simple
procedure and a remedy was available whether or not a benefit granted
under GATT was being impaired or nullified.45  Early sugges-
42. A considerable amount has been written about settling disputes under the
GATT. See supra note 29; Dillon, supra note 28 (providing a comprehensive look at the
general history and negotiations of GATT and the WTO and the structure, scope and
function of the new GATT/WTO dispute settlement process); Samuel C. Straight, GATT
and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty
States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216 (1995); see also G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and
International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE
L.J. 829 (1995) (looking at both the old and new GATT settlements and negotiating
histories, and how GATT applies to various economic theories). For an easy to follow
flow chart of how disputes in GATT proceed, refer to Scorrr & BUuRMAN, supra note
29, at 127, fig. 1.
43. GATT, supra note 32.
44. Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 16:
Settling Disputes in the GAIT: The Past, Present, and Future, 24 INT'L LAW 519, 521
(1990).
45. HUDC, supra note 29, at 52; GATT, supra note 32, arts. XXII, XXIII.
Articles XXII and XXIII comprise the dispute settlement provisions of GATI'. They
have been elaborated upon by various Agreements. Articles XXII (Consultation) and
XXIII (Nullification or Impairment) state:
XXII: (1) Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to,
and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such
representations as may be made by another contracting party with respect to
any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement.
(2) The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting
party, consult with any contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for
which it has not been possible to find a satisfactory solution through
consultation under paragraph 1.
XXIII: (1) If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing
to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired
or that attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the
result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its
obligations under this Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure,
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this
Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any situation,
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tions to have disputes settled by the International Court of Justice had
been rejected.46 By the third session of GAIT, disputes were referred
to informal, third party decision makers, acting within working parties. 7
However, at that time, the working parties were not meant to render
decisions. 8 By early 1950, an improved method to settle disputes was
being sought.49
In 1952, during the seventh GAT session, a single panel was
formed to hear all complaints.' The panel would hear arguments from
the concerned parties, comments from interested parties, and would then
meet alone to draft its report."' The final report would be issued after
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the
matter, make written representations or proposals to the other contracting
party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any contracting party
thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations
or proposals made to it.
(2) If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting
parties concerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type
described in paragraph 1 (c) of this Article, the matter may be referred to
the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall
promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make
appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider
to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate. The
CONTRACTING PARTIES may consult with contracting parties, with the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and with any
appropriate inter-governmental organization in cases where they consider
such consultation necessary. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider
that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may
authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any
other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations
under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the
circumstances. If the application to any contracting party of any concession
or obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall be free, not
later than sixty days after such action is taken, to give written notice to the
Executive Secretary to the CONTRACTING PARTIES of its intention to
withdrawal from this Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect upon
the sixtieth day following the day on which such notice is received by him.
46. HUDEC, supra note 29, at 52.
47. Id. at 78.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 79.
50. Id. at 85. Prior to this individual working parties were established for each
dispute.
51. Id. at 86-87.
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consultation with the concerned parties to the dispute.52 The panel
procedure became recognized as the process to settle bilateral disputes
during the tenth session in 1955.' 3 It was not until the 1979 Understand-
ing on Dispute Settlement Procedures that these unwritten rules became
codified. 4
Panels are usually comprised of three members, chosen by the
Director-General of GATT.55 Parties directly involved in the dispute are
not allowed to be represented on the panel.56 Those that do serve on a
panel are supposed to serve in their individual capacity, for the good of
GATT, and not as governmental representatives.5' Panels are allowed
to request information and technical advice from qualified individuals."
Their purpose is to render an objective decision. 9 If any contracting
party feels it has been harmed by another contracting party, it can start
the procedures to establish a panel.'
At the time of the Norway-U.S. salmon dispute, the procedure
governing dispute resolution by panel had four basic steps:
52. Id. at 87.
53. Id. at 91-92.
54. Pierre Pescatore, The GAIT Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Its Present
Situation and Its Prospects, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 6 (1993). These procedures were
further modified at the mid-term review of the Uruguay Round in 1989. Id. The new
procedures were provisionally adopted on a trial basis until the end of the Round. See
Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, 28 I.L.M. 1031
(1989). They have become operative under the WTO, as codified in the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 112 (1994), reprinted in THE FINAL TEXTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
AGREEMENTS INCLUDING THE AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION AS SIGNED ON APRIL 15, 1994 (Office of the United States Trade
Representative ed. 1994) at 353 [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding]. See
Dillon, supra note 28, at 357-359.
55. Pescatore, supra note 54, at 7-9. Panels can also be comprised of five
members.
56. Bello & Holmer, supra note 44, at 522.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Pescatore, supra note 54, at 7. See also Rosine Plank, An Unofficial
Description of How a GAIT Panel Works and Does Not, 4 J. INT'L ARE. 53 (1987) for
a more complete discussion of how a Panel functions.
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1. There had to be a consultation between the Contracting
Parties having the dispute in an attempt to settle their
differences on their own; if that failed, 6'
2. The complaining party could then ask the GATT Council to
create a panel;
3. Once the panel was created, the parties would argue their
case before the independent panel which then made findings
and recommendations to the GATT Council;
4. The GATT Council would decide if it should adopt the
panel's report.'
Any Contracting Party, including either of the parties involved in the
dispute, could block the Council's adoption of the report.' If a panel
report is not adopted, GATT does not publish it, nor will its recommen-
dations be binding on the offending Party or become precedent for future
GATr determinations.'
Until the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Settlement Understanding), there was no
right to appeal an unfavorable Panel Report. " This understanding
establishes a standing Appellate Body to hear appeals from panel
61. Consultations between members are now optional. Straight, supra note 42, at
223.
62. Bello & Holmer, supra note 44, at 523. Steps two through three are
substantially the same today. Pescatore, supra note 54, at 7-16. The GATT Council
consists of the Assembly of CONTRACTING PARTIES. The member countries or
organizations of GATT were once referred to as the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
However, today they are referred to as the Members of the WTO. Straight, supra note
42, at 222 n.34. This paper will utilize the older terminology.
63. Bello & Holmer, supra note 44, at 523. Today, only a consensus is required
to adopt a Panel Report, but appeals are allowed. This almost ensures that under the
present system, Panel Reports will be adopted, unmodified. Dillon, supra note 28, at
376.
64. ErwinP. Eichmann, Procedural Aspects of GATT Dispute Settlement: Moving
Towards Legalism, 8 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw. 38, 60 (1990).
65. Bello & Hohner, supra note 44, at 523; Dispute Settlement Understanding,
supra note 54. This Understanding was agreed to during the Uruguay Round of
negotiations, recently completed. Only parties to the dispute can appeal a panel decision,
and they can appeal only points of law and legal interpretation. Id. paras. 17.4 and 17.6.
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decisions.' The Dispute Settlement Understanding also requires a
consensus against the adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports
before they are rejected. Because of this, the parties involved in a
dispute cannot now singlehandedly block the adoption of such reports.'
If and when a Panel Report is adopted by the GATT Council, the
issue of enforcement arises.' Because panel recommendations are
simply recommendations, it is up to the disputing parties to comply.'
If a party fails to come into compliance with the panel's recommenda-
tions, international pressure may be required. In such cases, enforce-
ment must often be worked out diplomatically.7" These situations often
favor stronger countries who can back up retaliation threats.7
3. Status of GATT Under US. Law in 1992
The status of GATT in U.S. law is unique.7" Because GAT is an
international treaty to regulate foreign commerce, it should have been
66. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 54, para. 17.1. The Dispute
Settlement Body charged with administering the Understanding was established in the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). Id. para. 2.1. This body
is given the task of creating the appellate body. Id. para. 17.1. For a more complete
discussion of dispute settlement under the World Trade Organization, see supra note 42;
and WTO Briefing: The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, GATT Focus NEWSL. May
1994, at 12.
67. Id. at 12-13; see also supra note 63.
68. The new GATT dispute settlement process allows for three levels of relief for
the complaining party. First, respondents' non-complying measures can be brought into
compliance. Dillon, supra note 28, at 376. Second, the complaining party may receive
compensation for the sustained injury if the respondent does not bring the non-complying
measures into compliance. Id. Third, if the parties cannot reach an agreement as to the
appropriate compensation, the complaining party can retaliate within the same sector and
agreement under which the non-complying nation is deficient or, if the complaining party
believes that retaliation will be insufficient, it can seek authorization to retaliate across
the sectors and agreements. Id.
69. Eichmann, supra note 64, at 66.
70. Id. Under the new GATT, there are no direct enforcement provisions, but a
suspension of concessions and obligations under the Agreement in dispute can be used
(i.e. a suspension of low tariff rates). Id.; see also Dillon, supra note 28, at 376.
71. Pescatore, supra note 54, at 15.
72. This discussion reflects the status of GATT under U.S. law in 1992. Since the
end of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the 103d U.S. Congress has enacted enabling
legislation. Straight, supra note 42, at 219. Although this discussion no longer reflects
the status of GATT, it is important to an understanding of the legal background of the
dispute discussed in this article.
1996] U.S. Trade Law and Imported Farmed Atlantic Salmon 47
presented to the U.S. Senate for acceptance.73 However, GATT was
signed by President Truman as an Executive Agreement and Congress
never officially accepted it.74 Since President Truman's acceptance of
GATT, Congress had been careful to neither accept nor reject GATT
while drafting U.S. trade law.' In the absence of Congressional action,
the domestic legal validity of GATT has largely been established by case
law,76 and judicial interpretations of GATT's status have generally
viewed the agreement as binding.77
III: CASE STUDY: NORWEGIAN FARMED SALMON IMPORTS
INTO THE UNITED STATES
A. Preliminary Determinations by the USITC and USITA
Countervailing and antidumping duty investigations under U.S. law
can begin in two ways. The first is for the U.S. International Trade
Administration (USITA) to start an investigation on its own.7" The
second is for an interested party to file a petition with the USITA and the
USITC.79  Following this second route, twenty-one Maine and
73. Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
in United States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 479, 480 (1990). For a more
detailed discussion of this topic, see id.; Thomas William France, The Domestic Legal
Status of the GAIT: The Need for Clarification, 51 WAsH. &LEEL. REv. 1481 (1994);
David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction To International Trade Law In the
United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT L & COMP. L. 1 (1995).
74. Brand, supra note 73, at 482. In light of the public distrust of international
institutions after World War II, President Truman was forced not to seek Senate
ratification for the ITO. President Truman adopted GA'TT by executive act to similarly
avoid a controversy with Congress. Id.
75. Id. at 485. However, Congress authorized payment of GATT dues starting in
1974. Id.
76. Id. at 486.
77. Id. GATT's Binding nature seems more securely established with regard to
state law than federal law. Federal decisions seem to imply the legal binding authority
of GATT, without explaining the source of that authority. Id. at 489.
78. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(a), 1673a(a) (1994). Section 1671 deals with counter-
vailing duty investigations and section 1673 with antidumping duty investigations. Such
investigations are to be commenced by the administering authority whenever it deter-
mines, from information available to it, that a formal investigation is warranted.
Id. For a more complete explanation of administrative procedures of the USITA and the
USITC see Gantz, supra note 73.
79. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(b), 1673a(b) (1994); see also supra note 15.
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Washington Atlantic salmon producers, forming the Coalition for Fair
Atlantic Salmon Trade (FAST), filed a petition on February 28, 1990,
alleging that a U.S. industry was being "materially injured or threatened
with material injury" due to subsidized imports of fresh and chilled
Atlantic salmon from Norway and also that the subject imports were
being sold at less than fair market value (LTFV) in the United States.80
FAST wanted the USITA and USITC to investigate whether the
Norwegian Atlantic salmon farming industry was being subsidized, and
whether Norwegian farmed Atlantic salmon was being sold at less than
fair value in the United States resulting in harm to the domestic industry.
After receiving the petition, the USITA then had to determine
whether there were grounds to proceed with an affirmative determination
or whether the investigation was to be terminated."' The USITA
preliminarily determined that the subject imports were receiving
subsidies, estimated at 2.45 percent ad valorem' for all imports, from
the Norwegian government.83 The USITA also preliminarily determined
that the subject imports were or were likely to be sold at less than fair
80. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, USITC PuB. 2272, FRESH AND CHILLED ATLANTIC
SALMON FROM NORWAY: DETERMINATION OF THE COMMISSION IN INVESTIGATION No.
701-TA-302 AND 731-TA-454 (PRELIMINARY) UNDER THE TARIFF Acr OF 1930,
TOGETHER WITH THE INFORMATION OBTAINED IN THE INVESTIGATION 1 (1990)
[hereinafter USITC PRELIMINARY]. All of the actions in this paper relate to fresh
Atlantic salmon, defined as:
fresh whole and nearly-whole Atlantic salmon, including cleaned and/or gutted
fresh Atlantic salmon, whether or not with the head. Atlantic salmon is the
species Salmo salar. Fresh Atlantic salmon is generally marketed packed in
ice ('chilled'). Excluded from the subject product are fresh Atlantic salmon
fillets, steaks, or other cuts; Atlantic salmon that is frozen, canned, smoked,
or otherwise further processed; and other species of fish, including other
species of salmon, and their meats.
Id.
81. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(c)-(d), 1673a(c)-(d) (administrating authority shall
determine whether the petition alleges the elements necessary for the imposition of a duty
within 20 days after petition is filed).
82. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 51 (6th ed. 1990) defines an ad valorem duty as
"when the duty is laid in the form of a percentage of the value."
83. Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination; Fresh and Chilled
Atlantic Salmon from Norway, 55 Fed. Reg. 26,727 (Dep't Comm. 1990). The
following Norwegian programs were found to preliminarily confer subsidies: Regional
Development Fund Loans and Grants, National Fishery Bank of Norway Loans, Regional
Capital Tax Incentive, Reduced Payroll Taxes, Advance Depreciation of Business Assets,
and, Government-Funded Research and Development. Id. at 26,727-28.
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value.' The USITA published these preliminary determinations in June
and October of 1990.'
B. The USITC Final Determination
Following the preliminary affirmative investigation,86 the USITC
instituted a final investigation as to whether sales of imported Norwegian
salmon had been subsidized by the Norwegian government and sold at
less than fair value, injuring the U.S. industry.' In making its decisions
the USITC had to determine what comprises "like product" and
"domestic industry" under the statute.' Some of the factors the USITC
84. Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less ThanFair Value; Fresh and Chilled
Atlantic Salmon from Norway, 55 Fed. Reg. 40,418 (Dep't Comm. 1990). Margin
percentage of sales at LTFV were determined to be between .13 and 4.76 percent,
depending on the exporter. Id. at 40,421.
85. 55 Fed. Reg. 26,727; 55 Fed Reg. 40,418.
86. USITC PRELMINARY, supra note 80, at 30. As discussed above, preliminary
and final determination investigations are very similar, the primary difference being the
standard of review utilized. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. Because of
this, only the final determination investigation will be discussed in the text.
87. UNITED STATES INT'L TRADE COmM'N, USITC PuB. 2371, FRESH AND
CHILLED ATLANTIC SALMON FROM NORWAY: DETERMINATION OF THE CoMMISsION IN
INVESTIGATIONS No. 701-TA-302 AND 731-TA-454 (FINAL) UNDER =E TARMF Acr OF
1930, TOGm wrT THE INFORMATION OBTAINED IN THE INVESTIGATION 1-2 (1990)
[hereinafter USITC FINAL]. After the preliminary determination, the USITC has
seventy-five days, unless otherwise allowed, to make a final determination as to whether:
(1)(A) an industry in the United States-
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded,
by reason of imports, or sales (or the likelihood of sales) for importation, of
the merchandise with respect to which the administering authority has made an
affirmative determination ....
19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b), 1673d(b) (1994). The term -material injury" is defined as harm
which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A)
(1994). A discussion of how the various agencies and courts have defined these terms
is beyond the scope of this paper.
88. "Domestic like product" is a product which is like, or in the absence of like,
most similar in characteristics and uses with, the article subject to [a countervailing duty
or antidumping] investigation. ... 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (1994). For a more complete
discussion of the concept, negotiation history, and an analysis of like product in GATT
cases, see Rex J. Zedalis, A Theory of the GATT "Like" Product Common Language
Cases, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1994).
"Industry" is defined, under federal law, as: "the producers as a whole of a
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considers in making a like product determination are: "(1) physical
characteristics and uses, (2) interchangeability, (3) channels of distribu-
tion, (4) customer and producer perceptions, (5) common manufacturing
facilities and employees, and (6) price."" For the purposes of this
investigation, the USITC determined that the product in the United States
most "like" the subject import was fresh and chilled Atlantic salmon.'
The USITC decided not to include the different Pacific salmon
species as "like product" due to several distinctions between them and
Atlantic salmon.91 First, the Atlantic and the various Pacific salmon
species were judged to be different species and genera. 2 Pacific salmon
was also not included as a "like product" because of the difference in
methods of production in the two industries. 3  Pacific salmon are
generally harvested wild, while Atlantic salmon are farmed in both the
United States and in Norway due to bans on the commercial catch of
Atlantic salmon.' The two methods result in completely different
"processes, equipment, and employees. " '
The third distinction between Pacific and Atlantic salmon was the
limited interchangeability between the two species.' This limited
domestic like product, or those producers whose collective output of a domestic like
product constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of the product."
19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (1994).
89. USITC FINAL, supra note 87, at 3. Again, functional definitions of these terms
are beyond the scope of this Article. However, the actions taken in these investigations
shed some light on their meanings.
90. This determination was initially made during the preliminary investigation. Id.
at 4. All of the actions in this paper relate to fresh Atlantic salmon, defined as in
footnote 80 supra.
91. If the various Pacific species, with their lower average unit price, had been
included in the definition, there would have been a smaller difference between the
average (lower) price of Norwegian salmon and U.S. salmon. This might have
eliminated any duties assessed.
92 USITC FINAL, supra note 87, at 6. Pacific salmon consists of five species,
chinook, sockeye, chum, pink, coho; whereas Atlantic salmon is comprised of only one
species, Salmo salar. Pacific and Atlantic salmon belong to different genera as well.
Id. at 4-6.
93. Id. at 5-6.
94. Id. at 5. Norway argued that the differences in production of Pacific and
Atlantic salmon should not be considered because the differences are the result of the
legal prohibition on the commercial catch of Atlantic salmon, and not from inherent
differences between the fish. Id. The USITC did not agree with this argument. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 6.
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interchangeability is due to the fact that most Pacific salmon is eventually
frozen or canned, and exported, whereas most Atlantic salmon is sold
fresh in the United StatesY In addition, because Atlantic and Pacific
salmon are processed differently, they pass through different channels of
distribution. This was the fourth distinction." The different channels of
distribution and processing methods result in the fifth difference, lower
prices.' Because frozen and canned salmon generally do not "share
similar distribution channels or end-users [as fresh salmon] . . .the
former [Pacific salmon] is largely sold to further processors and resold
in the lower-end of the market in value-added form, whereas Atlantic
salmon is sold largely for resale to restaurants, the so-called white
tablecloth market."' The USITC included Atlantic salmon smolts
within its definition of "like product," however, because, although
smolts and adult salmon are not interchangeable, smolts have no other
use than to become adult salmon.'
Because the USITC had determined in its preliminary investigation
that a U.S. Atlantic salmon industry was established"~' and because no
new evidence was presented in contradiction to that conclusion, the
USITC proceeded to consider whether that domestic industry was
materially injured or threatened with material injury by LTFV imports
and/or subsidized imports from Norway.' In determining the condition
of the domestic industry, the USITC accounted for two distinct
characteristics of the industry: 1) although established, the industry was
still young and emerging, and 2) a three-year production cycle governs
the Atlantic salmon farming industry.' The USITC determined that the
domestic Atlantic salmon industry was being materially injured due to
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. Although this is the reasoning the USITC used, a trip to a local fish
market or fish counter at a large supermarket will most likely yield inexpensive fresh
Atlantic salmon.
101. Id. at 9.
102. USITC PRELIMINARY, supra note 80, at 16-17.
103. USITC FNAL, supra note 87, at 10-11. Were there no U.S. industry in
existence, the determination of the USITC would have focused on whether the
development of a U.S. industry was being materially retarded by the subject import. 19
U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(2)(B), 1673(2)(3) (1994).
104. USITC FNAL, supra note 87, at 12.
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negative financial performance and a leveling in the production of smolts
in spite of growing U.S. demand."05
The USITC then had to determine whether the subject imports were
the cause of this material injury or of any threat thereof."o To determine
this, the USITC had to consider the volume of imports, the effect of the
imports on prices of like products in the United States, the impact of
imports on the domestic producers of the like products, as well as other
relevant economic factors." The USITC was not required to determine
that the subject imports were the primary cause of injury to make an
affirmative determination, only that the subject imports were a cause of
such injury.0 8
When the USITC examined the volume and value of Norwegian
imports, it noted that they rose significantly between 1987 and 1989."°
Although imports increased in absolute terms, Norway's percentage of
market share, by volume, decreased from in excess of 75.0 percent in
1987 to 60.2 percent in 1989.110 A similar decline in market share, by
value terms, also occurred, from more than 75.0 percent in 1987 to 62.5
percent in 1989."' By 1990, imports from Norway had decreased
significantly.112
The USITC discounted the decline between 1989 and 1990 because
it felt the decline appeared to be "largely the result of the filing of the
petition and/or the imposition of provisional antidumping and counter-
vailing duties.""3 Norway claimed that the decline in imports was due
to the appreciation of the Norwegian kroner against the U.S. dollar, and
the imposition of a Norwegian freezing program making less fresh
105. Id. at 15.
106. Id. This requirement is stipulated in 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(b)(1) and §
1673d(b)(1), see supra note 87 for relevant text of these sections.
107. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B) (1994).
108. USITC FNAL, supra note 87, at 16.
109. Id. at 16-17. When the USITC examines volume of subject imports in such
an investigation, it must evaluate "whether the volume of imports of the merchandise,
or any increase in that volume, either in absolute terms or relative to production or
consumption in the United States, is significant." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(i) (1994).
110. USITC FINAL, supra note 87, at 17.
111. Id.
112. In 1990, Norwegian imports accounted for, by volume, 36.7 percent, and, by
value, 40.8 percent of apparent U.S. consumption. Id.
113. Id. The decline in imports was most pronounced after July 1990, which was
after the Department of Commerce's preliminary countervailing duty determination. Id.
at 17-18.
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salmon available for export." The USITC did not believe that these
factors could entirely explain the decrease in imports in the second half
of 1990.115 Because of the above reasoning, the USITC determined that
the increase in imports between 1987 and 1989 was significant,
especially given information concerning the nature of the U.S. industry,
the condition of the U.S. industry, and prices of like product." 6
The USITC noted that the price for the domestic like product and the
price of the subject imports closely tracked each other over much of the
investigation period."7 The USITC blamed the decline in price between
1988 and 1989 on an oversupply of Atlantic salmon in the U.S.
market."' Although other factors might have contributed to depressed
prices for U.S. salmon, the USITC reasoned that because Norway
accounted for a large percentage of the U.S. market supply, it "played
a role in the price decline.""' Due to this decline, U.S. producers were
less able to obtain bank financing. Additionally, the USITC found that
the volume of Norwegian imports and the inability of U.S. producers to
secure financing were responsible for keeping U.S. producers' prices
low, and kept them from recovering their costs and meeting cash flow
needs.' ° Thus, the USITC found that the U.S. industry was being
materially injured by the subject imports.'
Norway advanced a number of alternative factors that could have
been negatively affecting the U.S. industry. It suggested various
difficulties in U.S. production, third country imports, the inability of
U.S. producers to market their product year-round, and the effects of the
wild Pacific harvest, as all contributing to U.S. producer difficulties.
114. Id. at 18.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 19. When evaluating price information, the USITC must consider
whether:
(1) there has been significant price underselling by the imported merchandise
as compared with the price of domestic like products of the United States, and
(i) the effect of imports of such merchandise otherwise depresses prices to a
significant degree or prevents price increases, which otherwise would have
occurred, to a significant degree.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(ii) (1994).
118. U$ITC FINAL, supra note 87, at 19.
119. Id. This was determined in light of the fact that Norwegian Atlantic salmon
generally oversold domestic U.S. Atlantic salmon. Id.
120. Id. at 20-21.
121. Id. at 21-22.
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The USITC agreed that these factors might have contributed to U.S.
difficulties, but felt that the U.S. industry nonetheless was being
"materially injured by reason of subsidized and LTFV imports of fresh
and chilled Atlantic salmon from Norway. "
The USITA published its final duty determinations on April 12,
1991."3 The USITA instituted an antidumping duty margin of 23.80
percent for all but eight Norwegian exporters." For those eight
exporters, the duties ranged from 15.65 to 31.81 percent.' s The final
countervailing duty order required a cash deposit of 0.71 kroner per
kilogram for all subject imports.126 Because the USITA had determined
that the subject imports were being subsidized and were being sold at less
than fair value, and because the USITA had determined that the subject
imports were materially injuring the domestic industry, customs officers
were directed to assess the said duties on the subject imports.127 This
122. Id. at 22. Acting Chairman Anne E. Brunsdale dissented with the final
affirmative determination. Because Norway was exporting very little salmon to the U.S.
at the time of the final determination, those imports could not have materially injured
U.S. producers. Instead, she blamed world market conditions, the sharp decline in
Norwegian imports, and the increase in imports from other countries. Id. at 23-38.
123. Antidumping Duty Order: Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway,
56 Fed. Reg. 14,920 (Dep't Comm. 1991), and Countervailing Duty Order: Fresh and
Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, 56 Fed. Reg. 14,921 (Dep't Comm. 1991).
124. Antidumping Duty Order: Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon From Norway
56 Fed. Reg. 14,921 (Dep't Comm. 1991).
125. Id.
126. Countervailing Duty Order: Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon From Norway,
56 Fed. Reg. 14,921 (Dep't Comm. 1991).
127. 19 U.S.C. § 1671e(a) (1988) (current version as amended at 19 U.S.C. §
167le(a) (1994)) states, in part:
Assessment of Duty.
[The administering authority shall publish a countervailing duty order which-
(1) directs customs officers to assess a countervailing duty equal to the
amount of the net countervailable subsidy determined or estimated to
exist... within which the merchandise is entered, or withdrawn from
warehouse, for consumption,
(2) shall presumptively apply to all merchandise of such class or kind
exported from the country investigated, except that if-
(A) the administering authority determines there is a significant
differential between companies receiving subsidy benefits . . . the
order may provide for differing countervailing duties[.]
(However, a 1994 amendment to 1671e(a) has struck out paragraph 2). 19 U.S.C. §
1673e(a) (1988) (current version as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1671e(a) (1994) states, in
1996] U.S. Trade Law and Imported Farmed Atlantic Salmon 55
was done by requiring the importers to post a bond, cash deposit, or
other security in the amount of the duty, which is ultimately passed on
to consumers.' It is this increase in price of farmed Norwegian Atlantic
salmon that is responsible for essentially eliminating the import of
Norwegian salmon into the United States. It is still possible to import
fresh and chilled farmed Norwegian Atlantic salmon into the United
States, it is just cost prohibitive. In response to the actions taken by the
USITA, Norway appealed concurrently to the U.S. Court of International
Traden9 and to GATT.1 0
C. Norway's Appeal to the US. Court of International Trade
The U.S. Court of International Trade is the appeals body to which
a country may domestically challenge final affirmative countervailing and
antidumping duty determinations." In 1980, Congress passed the
Customs Court Act of 1980, which, among other things, changed the
name of the U.S. Customs Court to the U.S. Court of International
Trade.'m The 1980 Customs Court Act also clarified and expanded the
jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of International Trade in order to increase
the availability of judicial review in the field of international trade. 33
part:
Assessment of Duty.
Mhe administering authority shall publish an antidumping duty order which-(1) directs customs officers to assess an antidumping duty equal to the
amount by which the foreign market value of the merchandise exceeds
the United States price of the merchandise...
(3) requires the deposit of estimated antidumping duties pending
liquidation of entries of merchandise at the same time as estimated
normal customs duties on that merchandise are deposited.
128. OFFICE OF INT'L AFFAIRS, NOAA, supra note 8, at 264.
129. CHR. Bjelland Seafoods A/C (now Norwegian Salmon A/S), et al. v. United
States, et al. and Coalition for Fair Atlantic Salmon Trade, No. 91-05-00364, 1992 Ct.
Int'l Trade LEXIS 213 (Ct. Int'l Trade Oct. 23, 1992).
130. See infra sections I(E) and (F).
131. The Honorable Gregory W. Carman, Jurisdiction and the Court of
International Trade: Remarks of the Honorable Gregory W. Carman at the Conference
on International Business Practice Presented by the Center for Iispute Resolution on
February 27-28, 1992, 13 Nw. I. INT'L L. & Bus. 245, 249 (1992).
132. Id. at 248.
133. Id. Until then there had been some confusion as to whether federal district
courts or the Customs Court had jurisdiction in a case. 1d.
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After the USITC final affirmative determination of dumping and
subsidization, Norway challenged those determinations and the associated
duties that were placed on imported Norwegian salmon in the U.S. Court
of International Trade.3 4 The court does not "conduct a de novo 35
review of determinations by [the USITA] and [the USITC] in anti-
dumping and countervailing duty cases. "136 Rather, the court is "charged
to hold unlawful any determination which is not supported by substantial
evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'
Norway argued against three specific aspects of the USITC's determina-
tion. Norway argued that: 1) the USITC improperly discounted the
volume of imports in 1990, thereby incorrectly finding that the volume
of Norwegian imports was at a significant level; 2) there was not
substantial evidence to support the USITC's finding that the volume of
imports significantly depressed prices; and 3) the finding that imports
from Norway were adversely affecting the domestic industry at the time
of the final USITC determination was faulty and contrary to law. 3s
The Court of International Trade determined that: 1) the USITC had
not properly assessed the subject imports in 1990; 2) there was not
significant evidence to support the final determination of injury when it
was made at the time of the determination; and 3) that the determination
of injury was, therefore, contrary to law.'3 9 The court thereby reversed
and remanded the final USITC determination. 14
The USITC had given less weight to 1990 import data, which
showed a marked decrease in imports from 1989, because the decrease
was most pronounced after the USITC had instituted preliminary
countervailing duties.' Norway claimed that this was improper,
specifically attributing the decrease of imports in 1990 to the appreciation
134. CHR. Bjelland Seafoods A/C (now Norwegian Salmon AIS), et al. v. United
States, et al. and Coalition for Fair Atlantic Salmon, 1992 Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS at *1-2.
135. BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 435 (6th ed. 1990) defines de novo as "a second
time."
136. CHR. Bjelland Seafoods A/C (now Norwegian Salmon A/S), et al. v. United
States, et al. and Coalition for Fair Atlantic Salmon, 1992 Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS at *8.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *10.
139. Id. at *11.
140. Id. Because the court reversed the USITC decision on other grounds, the
court did not look at the price depression complaint. Id.
141. Id. at *14-*15.
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of the Norwegian kroner against the U.S. dollar.'42
The court noted evidence that imports had decreased as the kroner
appreciated. 43 It also found that imports from one exporter which was
found not to be receiving subsidies, and therefore did not have counter-
vailing duties leveled against it, had also decreased dramatically during
1990.1 The court noted that the USITC had failed to sufficiently
account for the possibility of the effects of the appreciated kroner.'45
The court also found that the USITC failed to account for the fact that
exports of Norwegian salmon to the European Community increased
during similar investigations. 46
Additionally, the USITC and Norway differed in their interpretation
of "present injury."'4 This forced the court to examine the issue. The
USITC argued that the continuing effects of a past injury can constitute
present injury.148  Norway argued that the injury must be currently
happening to constitute present injury.49 The court decided that it had
to determine whether "imports from Norway were causing present
material injury to the domestic industry at the time of the [USITC's]
determinations."" The court held that the USITC could not base
present injury on lingering effects of past injury.'5' The court reasoned
that basing its decision on such lingering effects would "frustrate the
solely remedial purposes of the antidumping and countervailing duty
statutes, which are intended to 'equalize competitive conditions between
the exporter and American industries affected'."' Thus, the Court
reversed USITC's final determination and remanded the case to that
body.'
142. Id. at *15.
143. Id. at *16-*17.
144. Id. at *17-*18.
145. Id. at *18.
146. Id. at *19.
147. Id. at *20.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at *23.
151. Id. at *28.
152. Id.
153. Id. at *28-*29.
58 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:33
D. USITC Views on Remand
The Court of International Trade, thus, indicated two errors in the
final USITC determination."l4 First, it indicated that the USITC had not
sufficiently explained the 1990 decrease in volume of Norwegian
imports.'55 This decrease was to be examined on remand. The USITC
was to take into account the appreciation of the Norwegian kroner against
the U.S. dollar. It was also to examine an increase in Norwegian
exports to the EC, in light of similar investigations, as well as evidence
that one Norwegian exporter, not subject to duties, had also decreased
its exports to the United States during the period of investigation. 56
On remand, the USITC again found that the appreciation of the
kroner did not account for all of the decline in 1990 imports."' This
finding was based partially on the observation that the price charged for
Norwegian salmon did not increase in proportion to the appreciation of
the kroner, as would be expected.' 58 Although Norwegian exports to the
EC did not decline during similar investigations, the USITC did not
believe that this detracted from its finding that its investigation resulted
in reduced Norwegian exports to the United States.'59 One factor
supporting this finding was that the EC, during their investigations, did
not impose provisional antidumping duties."6 For the above reasons, the
USITC again determined that the 1989-1990 decline in Norwegian
imports was due largely to its investigations.''
Second, the Court of International Trade found that the USITC had
improperly determined present injury by basing its finding of a negative
impact on the domestic industry on 1989 data, not 1990 data." The
court wanted the USITC to make a determination on present injury based
on the evidence at the time of its initial final determination. 13
154. UNITED STATES INT'L TRADE COMM'N, USITC PuB. 2589, VIEWS ON REMAND
N INVESTIGATIONS Nos. 701-TA-302 AND 731-TA-454 (FINAL) 1 (1992) [hereinafter
USITC REMAND].
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2.
157. Id. at 10.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 12.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 13.
162. Id. at 2.
163. Id.
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On remand, the USITC decided to limit its price data on the subject
imports to pre-July 1990.11 The USITC did not feel the court's decision
precluded this approach, as long as the USITC explained why it did
this.'6 The USITC did not want to use the post-June 1990 price data
because that data would have reflected the intended results of the
duties." The USITC determined that pre-July 1990 price data and the
large amount of LTFV salmon from Norway in the first half of 1990 was
affecting the price for domestic salmon, and supported its earlier
determination that present injury was occurring." The USITC also
noted that the subject imports hindered the domestic industry from
obtaining capital and investment.'
In accordance with the above reasoning, the USITC reaffirmed its
earlier affirmative determinations. 69 However, Vice Chairman Watson
and Commissioners Brunsdale and Crawford dissented with the above
views, because they did not feel the domestic industry was experiencing
present injury at the time of the USITC final determination.'70
164. Id. at 15.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 16.
168. Id. at 20.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 35. The USITC commissionwas comprised of six members: Chairman,
Don E. Newquist; Vice-Chairman, Peter S. Watson; and four commissioners, David B.
Rohr, Anne E. Brunsdale, Carol T. Crawford, and Janet A. Nuzum. Id. at inside cover.
A tie vote is considered an affirmative determination.
Following these actions, including the international actions discussed in the
following chapter, the USITA reviewed some of its decisions. The USITA has corrected
clerical and mathematical errors and conducted administrative reviews for some or all
Norwegian exporters, but has upheld that some level of margin exists. Fresh and Chilled
Atlantic Salmon from Norway; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,912 (Dep't Comm. 1993); Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon
from Norway; Preliminary Results of Antidumping Administrative Review, 58 Fed. Reg.
65,333 (Dep't Comm. 1993); Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway; Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 59 Fed. Reg. 12,242 (Dep't
Comm. 1994); Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon From Norway; Partial Termination of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 59 Fed. Reg. 47,610 (Dep't Comm. 1994);
Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmonfrom Norway; Amended Final Results of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Review, 60 Fed. Reg. 11,070 (Dep't Comm. 1995); Fresh and
Chilled SalmonFrom Norway; Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Review, 60 Fed. Reg. 49,579 (Dep't Comm. 1995); Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon
From Norway; Termination In-Part of New Shipper Antidumping Duty Administrative
Review, 60 Fed. Reg. 53,162 (Dep't Comm 1995); Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon
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As noted above, Norway challenged the duties imposed by the
United States both before the U.S. Court of International Trade and
under GATT. In contrast to the USITA and the USITC who essentially
treated the countervailing and antidumping investigations as one
investigation, at Norway's request, GATT established two separate
dispute settlement panels to deal with each aspect of the case.
E. GATT Countervailing Duty Determination
GATT's Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
established a Panel to review the affirmative finding by the USITC that
countervailing duties 7' should be imposed on the import of fresh and
chilled Atlantic salmon from Norway. Norway requested that this panel
find that the U.S. imposition of countervailing duties was inconsistent
with its international obligations under the Agreement on Interpretation
and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 12, 1979 (the Agreement)."7
Norway specifically asked the panel to find: 1) that originating the
countervailing duty investigation was contrary to Article 2:1 of the
Agreement; 2) that imposing countervailing duties related to Regional
Development Fund programs was contrary to Article 11 of the
Agreement; 3) that the calculation of the amount of subsidies by the U.S.
agencies was contrary to Article 4:2 of the Agreement; 4) that the
USITC's finding of material injury was inconsistent with Article 6 of the
Agreement; and 5) that continuing the use of the countervailing duties
From Norway: Termination of New Shipper Antidumping Duty Administrative Review,
60 Fed. Reg. 58,043 (Dept. Comm. 1995); and Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon From
Norway; Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; Time Limits, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,878
(Dep't Comm. 1996).
171. Article VI:3 of GATT defines a countervailing duty as: "the term
'countervailing duty' shall be understood to mean a special duty levied for the purpose
of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly or indirectly, upon the
manufacture, production or export of any merchandise." GATT, supra note 32, at 10.
Norway requested that a Panel be established by the Committee on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures on August 22, 1991. A Panel was established on September
26, 1991. SCM/153, supra note 10, at 4.
172. SCM/153, supra note 10, at 7. The Agreement is reprinted in 31 U.S.T. 513,
1186 U.N.T.S. 204 (1987). The Agreement entered into force on January 1, 1980 for
Norway and the U.S. 1186 U.N.T.S. at 204. Article VI of GATI concerns anti-
dumping and countervailing duties; Article XVI concerns subsidies; and Article XXIII
deals with nullification or impairment (dispute settlement). GATT, supra note 32.
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was inconsistent with Article 4:9 of the Agreement.'73 Norway originally
asked the panel to request the United States to remove the countervailing
duties. It later expanded that request to include U.S. reimbursement of
any duties already paid.'74
The United States also asked the panel for some determinations. It
wanted the panel to find that the USITC's determinations were consistent
with the obligations of the United States under the Agreement. The
United States asked the panel to find: 1) that the Department of
Commerce's determination of countervailable subsidies was consistent
with Part I of the Agreement; 2) that the calculation of the amount of
countervailing duties was consistent with Article 4:2 of the Agreement;
and 3) that the determination of material injury was consistent with
Article 6 of the Agreement.175
1. The Arguments of the Parties
a. Article VI as an Exception to GAIT
Article VI of GATT is concerned with antidumping and countervail-
ing duties and gives countries a way to protect themselves, under GATT,
against what they believe to be unfair trade subsidies. Article VI
condemns practices which materially injure the industries of other
countries and permits antidumping and countervailing duties to be levied
upon a proper showing. 76 Norway argued that Article VI is an
173. SCM1153, supra note 10, at 7.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 8.
176. GAIT, supra note 32, at 10-11. Article VI of GATT, Anti-dumping and
Countervailing Duties, Sections one and two deal solely with anti-dumping practices.
The rest of Article VI states, in part:
3. No countervailing duty shall be levied on any product of the territory of
any contracting party imported into the territory of another contracting party
in excess of an amount equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy determined to
have been granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufacture, production or
export of such product in the country of origin or exportation, including any
special subsidy to the transportation of a particular product ....
4. No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to anti-dumping or
countervailing duty by reason of the exemption of such product from duties or
taxes bome by the like product when destined for consumption in the country
of origin or exportation, or by reason of the refund of such duties or taxes.
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exception to Articles I and II of GATT, and therefore must be interpreted
narrowly, in view of the fact that the primary objective of GATT is to
reduce tariff rates on a Most Favored Nation basis.' It stated that the
party using this exception, the United States in this instance, carried the
burden of proof, and had to demonstrate that it had considered all the
necessary criteria.1"8 It was Norway's contention that the United States
had not met these requirements.179
5. No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to both anti-dumping
and countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation of dumping or
export subsidization.
6. (a) No contracting party shall levy any anti-dumping or countervailing duty
on the importation of any product of the territory of another contracting party
unless it determines that the effect of the dumping or subsidization, as the case
may be, is such as to cause or threaten material injury to an established
domestic industry, or is such as to retard materially the establishment of a
domestic industry.
(b) The CONTRACTING PARTIES may waive the requirement of sub-
paragraph (a) of this paragraph so as to permit a contracting party to levy an
anti-dumping or countervailing duty on the importation of any product for the
purpose of offsetting dumping or subsidization which causes or threatens
material injury to an industry in the territory of another contracting party
exporting the product concerned to the territory of the importing contracting
party. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall waive the requirements of sub-
paragraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to permit the levying of a countervailing
duty, in cases in which they find that a subsidy is causing or threatening
material injury to an industry in the territory of another contracting party
exporting the product concerned to the territory of the importing contracting
party. Waivers under the provisions of this sub-paragraph shall be granted
only on application by the contracting party proposing to levy an anti-dumping
or countervailing duty, as the case may be.
(c) In exceptional circumstances, however, where delay might cause
damage which would be difficult to repair, a contracting party may levy a
countervailing duty for the purpose referred to in sub-paragraph (b) of this
paragraph without the prior approval of the CONTRACTING PARTIES;
Provided that such action shall be reported immediately to the CONTRACT-
ING PARTIES and that the countervailing duty shall be withdrawn promptly
if the CONTRACTING PARTIES disapprove.
177. SCM/153, supra note 10, at 19, 22. Article I of GATT relates to Most-
Favored-Nation treatment. Article II relates to schedules of concessions. GATT, supra
note 32.
178. Id. at 19.
179. Id.
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The United States argued that the drafting, language and practice of
the contracting parties in the past demonstrated that Article VI was not
an exception. It relied partly on the strong language of Article VI,
stating that language such as "condemned" was not indicative of
exceptions, but of obligations.' The United States also argued that the
GATE drafters placed exceptions at the end of Part II and not at the
beginning, like Article VI. It also noted that exceptions were labeled as
exceptions, which Article VI is not." In addition, the United States
pointed to evidence in the negotiating history and practice of GATI'
indicating that the promotion of fair competition was, and remains, a
fundamental objective of GATT. For example, during initial
negotiations for GAIT, proposals were considered to allow the
imposition of tougher countermeasures than the duties eventually
included in GATT'.'
b. Initiation of the Countervailing Duty Investigation:
Article 2:1 of the Agreement
Article 2 of the Agreement concerns the domestic procedures
required to initiate countervailing duties." Norway contended that U.S.
180. Id.
181. Id. "Condemned" is located inparagraph 1 of Article VI. GATT, supranote
32.
182. SCM/153, supra note 10, at 19. The last four articles of Part II of GATT,
Articles XX-XXIII are: Article XX: General Exceptions; Article XXI: Security
Exceptions; Article XXII: Consultation; and Article XXIII: Nullification or Impairment.
GATr, supra note 32.
183. SCM/153, supra note 10, at 21-26.
184. Id. at 22.
185. The Agreement, supranote 172, art. 2, 31 U.S.T. at 519-520, 1186 U.N.T.S.
at 206. Article 2, Domestic Procedures and Related Matters, states, in part:
1. Countervailing duties may only be imposed pursuant to investigations
initiated [footnote omitted] and conducted in accordance with the provisions of
this Article. An investigation to determine the existence, degree and effect of
any alleged subsidy shall normally be initiated upon a written request by or on
behalf of the industry affected. The request shall include sufficient evidence
of the existence of (a) a subsidy and, if possible, its amount, (b) injury within
the meaning of Article VI of the General Agreement as interpreted by this
Agreement [footnote omitted] and (c) a causal link between the subsidized
imports and the alleged injury. If in special circumstances the authorities
concerned decide to initiate an investigation without having received such a
request, they shall proceed only if they have sufficient evidence on all points
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authorities did not adequately ensure that the request to initiate the
investigation was filed on behalf of the domestic industry before the U.S.
initiated the investigation. 8 ' It believed that the U.S. practice of
assuming that the domestic industry was represented unless at least fifty
percent of the concerned industry opposed the investigation, was contrary
to past panel reports.' 7
The United States argued against the importance of the panel report
relied upon by Norway. First, it had not been adopted by the GATr
Council. In addition, the panel report relied upon by Norway addressed
the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, not the Agreement now at issue."8 Furthermore,
the United States argued that because the "major portion" of the
domestic industry supported the petition that initiated the investigation,
it had adequately demonstrated industry support and had satisfied the
requirements for initiating the investigation. '
c. Determination of Counter-vailable Subsidies: Article 11
of the Agreement
Article 11 of the Agreement provides that local, regional, and
national subsidies are often used by governments to promote social,
economic, and national interests, and that GATT should not be applied
to these governmental actions, even though they might affect interna-
tional trade."9 Arguing that its Regional Development Fund programs,
under (a) to (c) above.
Id. The term "initiated" as used in this Agreement means "procedural action by which
a signatory formally commences an investigation as provided in paragraph 3 of this
Article." Id. 31 U.S.T. at 519 n.5, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 206 n.t. Also, under this Agree-
ment the term "injury" shall, unless otherwise specified, be defined as "material injury
to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material
retardation of the establishment of such an industry and shall be interpreted in accordance
with the provisions of Article 6." Id. 31 U.S.T. at 519 n.6, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 206 n.tt.
186. SCM/153, supra note 10, at 31.
187. Id. at 32.
188. SCM/153, supra note 10, at 32-33.
189. Id. at 31.
190. The Agreement, supra note 172, art. 11, 31 U.S.T. at 532-534, 1186
U.N.T.S. at 224. Article 11, Subsidies Other Than Export Subsidies, states, in part:
1. Signatories recognize that subsidies other than export subsidies are widely
used as important instruments for the promotion of social and economic policy
objectives and do not intend to restrict the right of signatories to use such
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providing aid to the salmon industry, involved the types of subsidies
subsidies to achieve these and other [important] policy objectives which they
consider desirable. [footnote omitted] Signatories note that among such
objectives are:
(a) The elimination of industrial, economic and social disadvantages of
specific regions,
(b) To facilitate the restructuring, under socially acceptable conditions,
of certain sectors, especially where this has become necessary by reason
of changes in trade and economic policies, including international
agreements resulting in lower barriers to trade,
(c) Generally to sustain employment and to encourage re-training and
change in employment,
(d) To encourage research and developmentprogrammes, especially in
the field of high-technology industries,
(e) The implementation of economic programmes and policies to promote the
economic and social development of developing countries,
(f) Redeployment of industry in order to avoid congestion and
environmental problems.
2. Signatories recognize, however, that subsidies other than export subsidies,
certain objectives and possible forms of which are described, respectively, in
paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, may cause or threaten to cause injury to a
domestic industry of another signatory or serious prejudice to the interests of
another signatory or may nullify or impair benefits accruing to another
signatory under the General Agreement, in particular where such subsidies
would adversely affect the conditions of normal competition. Signatories shall
therefore seek to avoid causing such effects through the use of subsidies. In
particular, signatories, when drawing up their policies and practices in this
field, in addition to evaluating the essential internal objectives to be achieved,
shall also weigh, as far as practicable, taking account of the nature of the
particular case, possible adverse effects on trade. They shall also consider the
conditions of world trade, production (e.g., price, capacity utilization, etc.) and
supply in the product concerned.
3. Signatories recognize that the objectives mentioned in paragraph I above
may be achieved, inter alia, by means of subsidies granted with the aim of
giving an advantage to certain enterprises. Examples of possible forms of such
subsidies are: government financing of commercial enterprises, including
grants, loans or guarantees; government provision or government financed
provision of utility, supply distribution and other operational or support
services or facilities; government subscription to, or provision of, equity
capital.
4. Signatories recognize further that, without prejudice to their rights under
this agreement, nothing in paragraphs 1-3 above and in particular the
enumeration of forms of subsidies creates, in itself, any basis for actionunder
the General Agreement, as interpreted by this Agreement.
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identified in Article 11 of the Agreement, Norway believed the United
States erred in imposing countervailing duties in relation to these
programs.191 It argued that the objective of these subsidies was solely to
influence the localization of domestic industries. This fact, Norway
believed, exempted it from GATIT."9 Norway also felt the United States
failed to consider whether these programs produced adverse trade affects,
as required by Article 11. 13
The United States argued that Norway's salmon subsidies were
countervailable and that levying a countervailing duty was consistent with
Part 1 of GATT which allows a signatory nation to levy such duties to
offset improper bounties or subsidies bestowed, directly or indirectly, to
the subject industry.'" Since the Regional Development Program loans
charged a lower interest rate than commercial banks, the loans were
countervailable "subsidies" or "bounties" provided on terms inconsistent
with commercial considerations. 95 The United States further noted that
nothing in GATT or the Agreement circumscribed the types of subsidies
which may be subject to the imposition of countervailing duties. The
plain language of each, to the contrary, expressly authorized countervail-
ing duties against any subsidy."9 In addition, Norway's contention that
trade effects be considered was not relevant to the current proceedings
according to the United States."9
d. Calculating the amount of the Subsidies: Article 4:2 of
the Agreement
Article 4:2 of the Agreement says that countervailing duties shall not
be levied in excess of the amount of the subsidy.'" Norway felt that the
191. SCM/153, supra note 10, at 37-41.
192. Id. at 41.
193. Id. at 37-41.
194. Id. at 37, 40.
195. Id. at 43.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 42.
198. The Agreement, supra note 172, art. 4, 31 U.S.T. at 523, 1186 U.N.T.S. at
212. Article 4, Imposition of Countervailing Duties, of the Agreement states:
2. No countervailing duty shall be levied [footnote omitted] on any imported
product in excess of the amount of the subsidy found to exist, calculated in
terms of subsidization per unit of the subsidized and exported product.
[footnote omitted]
Id. "Levy" is defined in the Agreement as "the definitive or final legal assessment or
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United States had failed to consider three aspects of the subsidies, and,
therefore, had miscalculated their amounts, resulting in excessive
countervailing duties.1"
The first complaint Norway raised was that the United States failed
to account for increased income and profit tax liability when it looked at
the reduction of payroll taxes levied on the industry.' It pointed out
that the alleged subsidy reduced deductible expenses available in
calculating taxable income. The government's action actually increased
the amount of taxable income, and thus, tax liability, of the industry."'
This increase in taxable income, Norway claimed, reduced other benefits
otherwise conferred by its programs. By not accounting for this result,
U.S. authorities levied improper countervailing duties.'
Norway also felt that the United States had overstated the commer-
cial long-term standard interest rate to which the Regional Development
Fund loans were compared to when it calculated the amount of the
Norwegian subsidy.' Norway advanced the idea that one commercial
bank in Norway, in 1990, charged a risk premium to fish farmers above
the bank's standard commercial loan interest rate but not above the
national average. Because of this, Norway believed the United States
overstated the average commercial lending rate.2
The United States was also accused of failing to determine whether
subsidies provided to smolt growers benefitted the exporters of the
salmon in question in its third complaint.S Norway stated that the
assumption that subsidies to smolt growers was passed on to salmon
exporters would result in an overstatement of the amount of subsidies to
be countervailed. This would, in return, unjustly inflate the amount of
the countervailing duties.'
collection of a duty [or] tax." Id. 31 U.S.T. at 523 n.14, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 212 n.*.
The Agreement also provides that "an understanding among signatories should be
developed setting out the criteria for the calculation of the amount of the subsidy." Id.
31 U.S.T. at 523 n.15, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 212 n.**.
199. SCM153, supra note 10, at 44-45.
200. Id. at 44-45.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 45.
203. Id. at 44-45.
204. Id. at 49.
205. Id. at 44.
206. Id. at 51.
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In response to Norway's first argument, the United States said that
there was no legal requirement that it consider potential secondary
subsidies when determining the amount of a subsidy,' because there are
too many variables to accomplish this effectively, and the variables are
often speculative.'
Replying to Norway's allegation that it had miscalculated the
commercial lending long-term interest rate, the United States stated that
commercial banks in Norway charged a 0.75 percent premium to salmon
farmers because of the risk involved.' Since Norway had failed to
consider this premium, the United States believed the rate it had
computed was correct.1 °
Countering the point that the United States was not entitled to
calculate upstream subsidies to exporters based on subsidies to smolt
growers, the U.S. stated that it had only lumped exporters and smolt
growers together because the Norwegian government combined these two
groups when responding to U.S. questionnaires on subsidies.21" ' The
United States assumed that Norway considered these two groups as one
industry because the Norwegian government lumped the two industries
together. 2  The Panel declined to decide this issue finding that the
matter was not within the scope of the Panel's jurisdiction.1 3
e. Determining the Existence of Injury: Article 6 of the
Agreement
Article 6 requires that, in determining the state of their domestic
industry for purposes of imposing duties, a country must examine: the
volume of subsidized imports to determine if a significant increase has
occurred; their effect on prices of like product in the domestic market to
see if price undercutting has resulted; and the impact of the imports on
207. Id. at 46. The U.S. cited footnote 15 to Article 4(2) of the Agreement which
indicates that parties should develop criteria to calculate the amount of a subsidy. See
supra note 198.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 48.
210. Id. at 48-50.
211. Id. at 52.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 93.
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the domestic industry.21  Norway asserted that the USITC
214. The Agreement, supra note 172, art. 6, 31 U.S.T. at 527-528, 1186 U.N.T.S.
at 216-218. Article 6, Determination of Injury, states, in part:
1. A determination of injury [footnote omitted] for purposes of Article VI of
the General Agreement shall involve an objective examination of both (a) the
volume of subsidized imports and their effect on prices in the domestic market
for like products [footnote omitted] and (b) the consequent impact of these
imports on domestic producers of such products.
2. With regard to volume of subsidized imports the investigating authorities
shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in subsidized
imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in
the importing signatory. With regard to the effect of the subsidized imports on
prices, the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a
significant price undercutting by the subsidized imports as compared with the
price of a like product of the importing signatory, or whether the effect of such
imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price
increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree. No
one or several of these factors can necessarily give decisive guidance.
3. The examination of the impact on the domestic industry concerned shall
include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a
bearing on the state of the industry such as actual and potential decline in
output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on investments, or
utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices: actual and potential
negative effects oncashflow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability
to raise capital or investment and, in the case agriculture, whether there has
been an increased burden on Government support programmes. This listis not
exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive
guidance.
4. It must be demonstrated that the subsidized imports are, through the effects
[footnote omitted] of the subsidy, causing injury within the meaning of this
Agreement. There may be other factors [footnote omitted] which at the same
time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by other factors
must not be attributed to the subsidized imports.
Id.
In this Agreement, determinations of injury shall be based onpositive evidence. In
determining threat of injury the investigating authorities, "may take into account the
evidence on the nature of the subsidy in question and the trade effects likely to arise
therefrom." Id. 31 U.S.T. at 527 n.17, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 216, n.*.
Throughout this Agreement the term like product shall mean "a product which is
identical, i.e., alike in all respects to the product under consideration or in the absence
of such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has
characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration." Id. 31
U.S.T. at 527 n.18, 1186 U.N.T.S at 216 n.**.
Factors (referred to in Section (1) which may be injuring the domestic industry can
include, "the volume and prices of non-subsidized imports of the product in question,
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findings were inconsistent with this Article215 and questioned whether
there had been an objective examination of the volume of imports, or a
significant increase in imports.21 Norway pointed out that between 1988
and 1990, the years of the initial USITC investigation, imports into the
United States of fresh and chilled salmon from Norway significantly
decreased, not increased.217
Norway further claimed that the USITC had erred in its determina-
tion that the price for imported Norwegian salmon was depressing the
domestic price, pointing out that the price paid for Norwegian salmon in
the United States had been consistently higher than the price paid for
domestic salmon.1 8 In addition, if Norwegian salmon had been
depressing the price paid for domestic U.S. salmon, Norway believed
that the price paid for domestic U.S. salmon should have increased when
Norwegian salmon was removed from the U.S. market in 1990, which
did not happen.19
Claiming its application and interpretation of the above Article was
consistent with its obligations, the United States asserted that the
Agreement did not foresee the use of Panels to determine factual issues.
Instead, factual issues were to be left to the investigating authorities (the
USITC here).2 The United States felt that the Panel should only
consider whether the USITC had considered required mandates of the
Agreement, not how they were considered."'
The United States argued the decrease in imports from Norway in
1990 was attributable to instituting preliminary countervailing and
antidumping duties.2 The United States, therefore, based its action on
the large increases in imports of Norwegian salmon between 1987 and
1989, not 1990 and post 1990 import data.' The United States also
contraction in demand or changes in the pattern of consumption, trade restrictive
practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments
in technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry."
Id. 31 U.S.T. at 528 n.20, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 218 n.**.
215. SCM/153, supra note 10, at 53.
216. Id. at 55.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 63.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 53-54.
221. Id. at 54.
222. Id. at 58-59.
223. Id. at 59.
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argued, in defense against Norway's claim that it erred in its finding on
the effect of prices, that the price paid for U.S. salmon and Norwegian
salmon closely paralleled each other, and that whenthe price of
Norwegian salmon fell, the price for U.S. salmon also fell.'
f Continued Imposition of Countervailing Duties: Article
4:9 of the Agreement
Article 4:9 of the Agreement states that "[a] countervailing duty shall
remain in force only as long as, and to the extent necessary to counteract
the subsidization which is causing injury." Norway argued that at the
time of the USITC final determination, no material injury was being
done to the U.S. industry, therefore, the countervailing duties should be
eliminated.' Even if past imports had caused injury, Norway claimed
that the level of imports of fresh and chilled salmon from Norway had
declined so much that they clearly were not causing present injuryY6
However, the United States disagreed with this claim, pointing out that
countervailing duties are supposed to eliminate the harm done prior to
their enactment, whether or not the injury is continuing.7 Otherwise,
an order would have to be eliminated as soon as it was established."
2. The Panel's Findings on Countervailing Duties
The Panel found that the United States had lived up to its obligations
under Article 2:1 of the Agreement in initiating the investigation."
Since the USITC had received a written request on behalf of the
appropriate domestic industry to bring the investigation, the Panel
believed that the United States had acted appropriately.'
In response to Norway's argument that the Regional Development
Fund was exempt from having countervailing duties levied against it, per
Article 11 of the Agreement, the Panel found that although Article 11
allowed for the subsidy, it was acceptable for other governments to react
224. Id. at 64.
225. Id. at 89.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. The United States called Norway's argument, "absurd on its face."
229. Id. at 98.
230. Id. at 99.
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to it with countervailing duties." Therefore, although Norway could
establish subsidies aimed at improving social and/or economic conditions
within their country, the United States was entitled to counteract those
subsidies when they interfered with fair international trade.'
In interpreting Article 4:2 of the Agreement and calculating the
amount of subsidization provided by the payroll tax reduction, the Panel
noted that there was not an established method to determine the amount
of a subsidy? 3 This lack of an established legal requirement allowed the
United States to calculate the subsidy as it had.' It also felt that the
United States had used an acceptable method to determine the benchmark
long-term interest rate to use in evaluating loans. 5 The United States
was also found to have acted consistently with Article 6 of the
Agreement when it determined whether a domestic industry was facing
present injury."6  Since all of the Panel's conclusions supported the
United States, it upheld the USITC's practice and its imposition of
countervailing duties. This Panel Report was adopted by the GATT
Council on April 28, 1994.1 Thus, the Panel Report is binding and is
precedent for future determinations under GATT.
F GATT Anti-Dumping Duty Determination
The Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices established a sister
Panel 8 to the one created by the Committee on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures." This Panel's Report, the Anti-Dumping Practices
Panel Report, deals with Norway's appeal from the USITC's affirmative
dumping determination of April 1991." Norway asked this Panel to
231. Id. at 102.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 103.
234. Id. at 104.
235. Id. at 106.
236. Id. at 134.
237. Letter from J. E., GATr Information Division, Geneva, Switzerland, to Mark
T. Peterson (May 9, 1994) (on file with the OCEAN & COASTAL L.J.).
238. COMMInrEEONANTI-DuMPINGPRACrICES, UNTrED STATES- IMPOSITION OF
ANTI-DUMPING DuTIEs ON IMPORTS OF FRESH AND CHILLED ATLANTIC SALMON FROM
NORWAY: REPORT OF THE PANEL, GATT, GATT Doe. ADP/87, (1992) [hereinafter
ADP/87]. Norway requested that a Panel be established for this dispute on September
24, 1991. The Panel was established on October 21, 1991. Id. at 5.
239. SCM/153, supra note 10.
240. ADP/87, supra note 238, at 6.
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find that the United States' imposition of antidumping duties was
inconsistent with its international obligations under GATT and the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter Article VI Agreement). 1 In reaching this
conclusion, Norway asked the Panel for four specific findings: 1) that the
United States' initiation of an antidumping duty investigation was
contrary to Article 5:1 of the Article VI Agreement; 2) that the final
affirmative determination of the existence of dumping made by the
Department of Commerce was inconsistent with Articles 2:4, 2:6, 6:1,
and 8:3 of the Article VI Agreement, and Article ImI of GArTT; 3) that
the final affirmative determination of injury made by the USITC was
contrary to Article 3 of the Article VI Agreement; and, 4) that the
continued imposition of antidumping duties by the United States was
inconsistent with Article 9:1 of the Article VI Agreement. 2
The United States requested that the Panel find that the Department
of Commerce (USITA) and the USITC had acted consistently with their
international obligations when making their determinations, and in
initiating their antidumping investigation. 3 It asked the Panel for two
specific findings: 1) that the final affirmnative determination of dumping
made by the Department of Commerce was consistent with the United
States' obligations under the appropriate sections of Articles 2 and 6 of
the Article VI Agreement and 2) that the USITC acted consistently with
Article 3 of the Article VI Agreement in its final affirmative determina-
tion of injury.'
241. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919, 1186 U.N.T.S. 2. The Article VI
Agreement entered into force on January 1, 1980 for Norway and the United States. 11
U.N.T.S. at 2. Although Article VI of GATT deals with both antidumping and
countervailing duties, the Article VI Agreement only deals with antidumping.
242. ADP/87, supra note 238, at 11. Similar to the Countervailing Panel Report
(SCMJ153, supra note 10), Norway initially asked the Panel to have the U.S. eliminate
its antidumping duties on the import of fresh and chilled Atlantic salmon from Norway,
then expanded that request to have the Panel request the U.S. to reimburse Norway for
any duties already paid as well. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 12.
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1. The Arguments of the Parties
a. Article VI as an Exception to GATT
Norway presented the same argument before this Panel as it did
before the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Panel.
Because Norway's arguments and the United States' responses were
essentially the same and were covered in the last section, they will not
be discussed again.s
b. Initiation of the Anti-Dumping Duty Investigation: Article
5:1 of the Article VI Agreement
Article 5:1 of the Article VI Agreement requires that the initiation
of an antidumping duty investigation be started by the appropriate
245. See supra notes 176-184 and accompanying text. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Article VI of GATr, which deal solely with anti-dumping practices, state:
1. The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which products of one
country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the
normal value of the products, is to be condemned if it causes or threatens
material injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting party
or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry. For the
purposes of this Article, a product is to be considered as being introduced into
the commerce of an importing country at less than its normal value, if the price
of the product exported from one country to another
(a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade,
for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting
country, or,
(b) in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either
(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export
to any third country in the ordinary course of trade, or
(ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of
origin plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and profit.
Due allowance shall be made in each case for differences in conditions and
terms of sale, for differences in taxation, and other differences affecting price
comparability.
2. In order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may levy on any
dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than the margin
of dumping in respect of such product. For the purposes of this Article, the
margin of dumping is the price difference determined in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 1.
GATT, supra note 32, at 10.
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industry.2 6 Arguing again that U.S. authorities failed to adequately
ensure themselves that the petition requesting the initial investigation was
filed on behalf of the domestic industry, Norway felt that the United
States should not have acted on the petition. 7 It argued that the U.S.
practice of assuming that a petition to initiate an investigation was
supported by the domestic industry unless at least fifty percent of the
industry expressed opposition to it was insufficient.' There also
appeared to be evidence that not all salmon growers in the United States
supported the petition. 9
Once again, the United States argued that the initial petition came
from a majority of U.S. salmon growers and, thus, was filed on behalf
of the domestic industry. It pointed out that, although some salmon
growers in the United States did not affirmatively support the petition,
they did not expressly oppose it.' Because of this, the United States
felt it had acted appropriately.
246. Article VI Agreement, supra note 241, art. 5, 31 U.S.T. at 4928, 1186
U.N.T.S. at 10. Article 5, Initiation and Subsequent Investigation, of the Article VI
Agreement states, in part:
1. An investigation to determine the existence, degree and effect of any
alleged dumping shall normally be initiated upon a written request by or on
behalf of the industry affected. The request shall include sufficient evidence
of the existence of (a) dumping; (b) injury within the meaning of Article VI of
the General Agreement as interpreted by this Code and (c) a causal link
between the dumped imports and the alleged injury. If in special circumstances
the authorities concerned decide to initiate an investigation without having
received such a request, they shallproceed only if they have sufficient evidence
on all points under (a) to (c) above.
Id. Article 4, Definition of Industry, of the Article VI Agreement states, in part:
1. In determining injury the term 'domestic industry' shall be interpreted as
referring to the domestic producers as a whole of like products or to those of
them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of
the total domestic production of those products ....
Id. art. 4, 31 U.S.T. at 4927, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 8.
247. ADP/87, supra note 238, at 36-37.
248. Id. at 37-38.
249. Id. at 40. This is mainly due to a letter from the Washington State Fish
Growers Association to U.S. authorities. Id. at 41.
250. Id. at 37, 41.
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c. Determination of Dumping
Norway claimed that the United States had failed to live up to its
obligations under the Article VI Agreement when reaching its final
affirmative dumping determination. Norway argued: 1) that the
Department of Commerce (DOC) did not follow "fair and equitable
procedures"; 2) that the dumping margins had been calculated incor-
rectly, contrary to Articles 2:6 and 8:3 of the Article VI Agreement;
and, 3) that the DOC failed to conduct a fair comparison between the
normal value of the subject import and its export price, also contrary to
Articles 2:6 and 8:3 of the Article VI Agreement. 1
There were a number of arguments put forth by Norway to support
its claim that the United States had not acted fairly and equitably. First,
Norway felt that the DOC had not allowed Norwegian exporters ample
time to answer a questionnaire designed to solicit information needed to
make the dumping determination. 2 Norway felt this caused the DOC
to act on incorrect or insufficient evidence. In its own defense, the
United States pointed out that Norway's allegations were only relevant
to one section of the questionnaire. In addition, it referred the Panel to
the fact that Norwegian respondents could have requested an extension
to answer the questions. Because of this, the United States felt it had
acted fairly and equitably. 3
It was also claimed by Norway that the U.S. respondents had been
favored in the application of questionnaire procedures by the DOC, and
that this violated Article 111:4 of GATT.' It was argued that the
Norwegian respondents were held to more stringent standards both when
251. Id. at 43.
252. Id. at 44-46.
253. Id. at 46.
254. Id. at 53. Article III, National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation,
of GATT states, in part:
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all
laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this
paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation
charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means
of transport and not on the nationality of the product.
GATT, supra note 32, at 6.
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responding to the questionnaire, and when the information provided was
verified by the DOC. 5
The United States countered these claims by stating that it had
requested the information it needed in the most useful media. Since
different information was required of the U.S. and Norwegian respon-
dents, different media were requested. 6 The United States also noted
that 95 percent of U.S. respondents answered the questionnaire
completely, while fewer than half of the Norwegian exporters answered
at all. The DOC could only base its findings on available information.'
Norway also challenged the finding of the DOC that third-country
sales below the costs of production did not fall within the ordinary course
of trade. The DOC had refused to use sales to the European Economic
Community (EEC) as the appropriate third-country benchmark against
which to compare sales to the United States. Norway claimed that this
violated Article 2:4 of the Implementation Agreement." It believed the
EEC should have been used as the third-country because it was the
world's largest importer of fresh salmon and because Norwegian Atlantic
salmon had the largest share within that market. 9 Therefore, if Norway
sold salmon below costs to the EEC, that sales price should be consid-
ered "in the ordinary course of trade. "21
Because the majority of Norwegian salmon sold in the EEC was sold
below the costs of production, the United States felt that it was entitled
255. ADP/87, supra note 238, at 54.
256. Id. at 55.
257. Id. at 56.
258. Id. Article 2, Determination of Dumping, of the Article VI Agreement states,
in part:
4. When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade
in the domestic market of the exporting country or when, because of the
particular market situation, such sales do not permit a proper comparison, the
margin of dumping shall be determined by comparison with a comparable price
of the like product when exported to any third country which may be the
highest such export price but should be a representative price, or with the cost
of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable amount for
administrative, selling, and any other costs and for profits. As a general rule,
the addition for profit shall not exceed the profit normally realized on sales of
products of the same general category in the domestic market of the country
of origin.
Article VI Agreement, supranote241, art. 2, 31 U.S.T. at 4925, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 4-5.
259. ADP/87, supra note 238, at 56-57.
260. Id. at 57.
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to, and required by law to use a constructed value of Norwegian salmon
rather than third-country sales data.261 The United States further stated
that since Article 2:4 of the Article VI Agreement did not give
preference to the use of third-country sales data over a constructed value
to determine the normal value of a product, the United States was
entitled to determine the normal value as it had.26
In addition to these claims, Norway also argued that the United
States calculated the costs of production that it used in its determination
on the basis of costs to salmon farmers, not salmon exporters. Norway
believed that since salmon farmers did not set the export price, or even
export the salmon, their costs should not be used.2" Instead, Norway
believed that the cost of salmon acquisition to the exporters should be the
appropriate cost of production, because the exporters would not know,
or care, about the actual costs to the farmers.' This practice of the
United States, Norway believed, overstated the actual costs of production
to exporters who negotiated with growers for the best purchase price and
then set the export price.2
The United States pointed out that Article 2:4 required them to use
"'the cost of production in the country of origin'" in their calculations,
not the acquisition costs to the exporters.2" Since the exporters generally
did not produce the fish, as a result of Norwegian law that prohibited
exporters from producing salmon, they had no actual "production" costs,
thus giving further reason for why the DOC had to rely on the salmon
farmers' costs.267 Accordingly, the United States contended that it acted
within its obligations.
Norway further argued that, even if the use of constructed values and
costs to salmon producers was proper, the DOC's methodology in
determining those constructed values was contrary to Articles 2:4 and
8:32" of the Article VI Agreement for a number of reasons. This
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 59.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 60 (citing Article VI Agreement, supra note 241, 31 U.S.T. at 4925,
1186 U.N.T.S. at 6).
267. Id.
268. See supra note 258 for text of Article 2:4. Article 8, Imposition and
Collection of Anti-Dumping Duties, of the Article VI Agreement states, in part:
3. The amount of the anti-dumping duty must not exceed the margin of
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contention was supported by allegations that the United States had
sampled too few fish farms in determining the price of production,
resulting in an overstated costs of production figure.2 69 This conclusion
was supported by the fact that the U.S. figure was significantly higher
than that reached by an EEC investigation into Norwegian salmon
dumping in the EEC, and because the figure was higher than a figure
arrived at by Norwegian officials.Y Norway claimed the United States
failed to account for differences in costs of production between different-
sized farms."
The United States responded by stating that it had done its best to
obtain a representative sample of farmers from which exporters
purchased salmon during the investigation period.' The sample might
not have been as representative as Norway or the United States might
have liked, but, due to faulty reporting by Norwegian exporters and time
constraints, the sample was as representative as possible.273
Norway further argued that by using a simple average, not a
weighted average, the United States further skewed its calculation of the
constructed normal price in determining the cost of production. 4 This
U.S. practice, according to Norway, more than doubled the dumping
margin, from 9 percent to 23.8 percent.275 Norway argued that the Unit-
ed States should have accounted for the fact that differently sized
producers of salmon had different average costs of production. By not
weighting various figures to account for these differences, it concluded,
the United States erred in its calculations. 276
dumping as established under Article 2. Therefore, if subsequent to the
application of the anti-dumping duty it is found that the duty so collected
exceeds the actual dumping margin, the amount in excess of the margin shall
be reimbursed as quickly as possible.
Article VI Agreement, supra note 241, art. 8, 31 U.S.T. at 4932, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 16.
269. ADP/87, supra note 238, at 64.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 66-67.
273. Id. at 67.
274. Id. at 75.
275. Id.
276. Id. Norway pointed out that the largest farm in the sample had a cost of
production of 26.24 NOK/kg, while smaller farms had costs up to 48.06 NOK/kg. Id.
Norway also pointed out that the seven farms used in the sample had an average cost of
production of 35.45 NOK/kg, while an annual survey conducted by the Norwegian
Directorate of Fisheries determined an average cost of production at 30.47 NOK/kg. Id.
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Claiming that it had correctly used a simple average, the United
States pointed out that 96 percent of salmon farming in Norway takes
place on small farms. 7  It also argued that one of the farms sampled
was one of the largest in Norway. Therefore, if a weighted average had
been used, that farm would have been given undo importance and the
constructed price would have been too low.278
The final problem that Norway had with the U.S. dumping
determination centered on the failure of the United States to account for
the different sizes and qualities of the salmon produced in Norway.279
The DOC calculated one average cost for all sizes and qualities of
salmon, and compared that value to the prices of individual exports.2"
Norway said that this methodology biased the comparison in favor of the
U.S. domestic industry, by creating dumping margins where none would
have existed if the United States had made a "fair comparison.""'
In supporting of the DOC's methodology, the United States pointed
out that the Article VI Agreement does not prohibit such a comparison,
nor does it specify any particular methodology for comparison.' The
at 76.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 87. Norway produces three qualities of salmon: production, ordinary,
and superior; and three size classes: 2-3 kilos, 3-4 kilos, and 4-5 kilos. The three sizes
of superior quality salmon were sold for export to the United States. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. This is so because the average normal price of production lowered the
average constructed cost of production for larger, higher quality salmon, thereby
increasing the dumping margin on higher value and priced salmon. Id. Norway
supported its argument with the following illustration:
To illustrate how this method of comparing export prices and normal values
inevitably led to findings of dumping, Norway gave the example of a situation
in which in the domestic market [(representing Norway)] three sales
[(representing different weight classes of salmon)] were made at different
points in time at prices of 80, 100 and 120. If there were three export sales
at different points in time, also at prices of 80, 100 and 120, the comparison
of an average normal value [(100)] with individual export prices (80) would
inevitably result in a finding of dumping in respect of the first of these three
export sales.
Id. at 87-88 n.143. Such a result could have the effect of classifying one-half of all
exports as being dumped, when in reality, they have been sold at the same price abroad
as in the domestic market.
282. Id. at 89.
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Article VI Agreement only requires that a price comparison be fair.'
The United States found further support for its position in the fact that
the type of comparison that it employed was used by most countries with
antidumping laws.'
d. Determination of Injury: Article 3 of the Article VI
Agreement
Norway argued that the USITC determination of injury was
inconsistent with Articles 3:1, 3:2, 3:3, and 3:4 of the Article VI
Agreement. First, Article 3:1 of this agreement requires that an
"objective examination" of the relevant imports be made to determine
injury.' Norway claimed the United States had failed to properly
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Article VI Agreement, supra note 241, art. 3, 31 U.S.T. at 4926-4927, 1186
U.N.T.S. at 7-8. Article 3, Determination of Injury, of the Article VI Agreement states,
in part:
1. A determination of injury for the purposes of Article VI of the General
Agreement shall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective
examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and their effect on
prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact
of these imports on domestic producers of such products.
2. With regard to volume of the dumped imports the investigating authorities
shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports,
either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the
importing country. With regard to the effect of the dumped product on prices,
the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant
price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like
product of the importing country, or whether the effect of such imports is
otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases,
which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree. No one or
several of these factors can necessarily give decisive guidance.
3. The examination of the impact on the industry concerned shall include an
evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the
state of the industry such as actual and potential decline in output, sales,
market share, profits, productivity, return on investments, or utilization of
capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; actual and potential negative on
cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or
investments. This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors
necessarily give decisive guidance.
4. It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects
of dumping, causing injury within the meaning of this Code. There may be
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examine the volume of the subject imports, their effect on the price of
like product in the United States, and their the impact on U.S. producers.
This was necessary, according to Norway, to ensure that the allegedly
dumped Norwegian imports were actually causing present material
injury, and failing to determine whether the effects of other factors
causing injury were attributed to the Norwegian imports. 6
Second, noting that Article 3:2 requires a "significant increase" in
imports during the investigation period for an affirmative injury
determination to be made, Norway argued that imports actually fell
between 1988 and 1990, the period of the investigation, whether
measured in relative or absolute terms.' It further claimed that the
USITC failed to account for this decline, instead relying on an increase
in imports between 1988 and 1989.' Claiming the decline in exports
to the United States between 1988 and 1990 was attributable to factors
other than the initiation of dumping and countervailing duty investiga-
tions by the United States, Norway blamed this decline on lower
domestic prices, appreciation of the Norwegian kroner against the U.S.
dollar, and rising prices in alternative export markets. 9 Because there
was an absolute decline in farmed Norwegian Atlantic salmon imports
into the United States during the USITC investigation period, and since
this decline could not, it claimed, be attributed to the initiation of U.S.
dumping and countervailing investigations, Norway concluded that the
United States failed to live up to its international obligations in imposing
an antidumping duty.2"
In response to the above accusations, the United States argued that
the decline in imports between 1988 and 1990 was directly attributable
to the filing of the initial petition by FAST, and the subsequent investiga-
tions.29' It also said that the other factors highlighted by Norway had
other factors which at the same time are injuring the industry, and the injuries
caused by other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports.
Id.
286. ADP/87, supra note 238, at 94.
287. Id. at 96. The United States imported 8,895,000 kg of salmon in 1988, and
7,699,000 kg of salmon in 1990, from Norway. Id. at 220.
288. ADP/87, supra note 238, at 97. In 1989, the United States imported
11,396,000 kg of salmon from Norway. Id. at 220.
289. Id. at 98.
290. Id. at 96, 98.
291. Id. at 100.
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been examined,2' but that it had been determined that they did not
wholly explain the decrease in imports. In addition, there had been a
finding that the "'sheer volume of the increase in Norwegian Atlantic
salmon imports in 1989' alone had led to significant price depression. "2"
These conclusions led the USITC to believe it had satisfied its interna-
tional obligations during its proceedings.'
The USITC finding that imports of Norwegian Atlantic salmon
significantly depressed domestic U.S. prices, as required under Article
3:1 of the investigation, was also disputed by Norway. 95 Norway
demonstrated that the price received for Norwegian salmon increased
during the investigation period, while the price paid for domestic salmon
decreased. If prices for domestic salmon "closely tracked" Norwegian
salmon prices, as the USITC claimed, then domestic prices should also
have risen, not Mallen.2" Further, if Norwegian salmon was depressing
the price for U.S. salmon, the removal of Norwegian salmon from the
market should have allowed the price of U.S. salmon to rise, which it
did not.2" In further support of its position, Norway noted the existence
of other, lower-priced salmon in the U.S. market from third-party
countries. These imports were logically more likely to have been the
cause of a depression in U.S. domestic prices, not the higher-priced
Norwegian salmon imports.2"
The United States believed that it was the "large and growing glut
of Norwegian imports" that was depressing domestic U.S. prices, and
that the decline in U.S. salmon prices closely tracked the decline in the
price paid for Norwegian salmon.2' Because of the combination of the
above factors, the United States felt it had sufficiently demonstrated that
imports of Norwegian Atlantic salmon had depressed the price received
by domestic producers."
Norway also disputed the existence of a causal relationship between
Norwegian imports and injury to the domestic industry. Such a
relationship is required, under Article 3:4 of the Article VI Agreement,
292. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
293. ADP/87, supranote 238, at 101 (quoting USITC FNAL, supra note 87, at2O).
294. ADP/87, supra note 238, at 101.
295. Id. at 104.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 105.
298. Id. at 109.
299. Id. at 105.
300. Id. at 110.
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before duties can be imposed. Norway claimed that the USITC had not
distinguished between the effect of Norwegian imports and the effects of
other factors on the U.S. industry. It believed that USITC had not
sufficiently demonstrated that harm to the U.S. industry had been caused
by Norwegian imports "through the effects of dumping. ""o In addition,
Norway complained that the USITC had not shown that Norwegian
imports were causing material injury to the U.S. industry at the time of
the USITC final determination.30
Again, the United States argued that the USITC had amply
considered, and then rejected, the impacts of other factors on the U.S.
industry.' Pointing out that Article 3:4 of the Article VI Agreement
requires only that investigating authorities must consider other factors in
determining injury, the United States argued that it was not required to
"'exclude any injuries caused by factors other than dumped imports'"
when reaching its injury determination.' The United States stated that
the USITC acted appropriately in determining a causal relationship
between Norwegian fresh and chilled salmon imports and material injury
to the domestic industry.
In support of the USITC's finding of material injury at the time of
the final USITC determination, the United States claimed that the Article
VI Agreement allowed parties to counteract continuing, injurious effects
by imposing duties. Injury, thus, can include an industry's continued
difficulty in raising capital. 5 Otherwise, the United States pointed out,
exporters would be able "to ensure a negative determination by reducing
their exports and raising their prices. An unscrupulous exporter could
guarantee the outcome of any investigation and simply resume its
injurious dumped exports once a negative determination had been
entered. "3
301. Id. at 114.
302. Id. at 114-115.
303. Id. at 118.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 130.
306. Id.
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e. Continued Imposition ofAntidumping Duties: Article 9:1
of the Article VI Agreement
Norway also argued that the continued imposition of antidumping
duties was contrary to Article 9:1 of the Article VI Agreement.' It felt
that, since no material injury was being done at the time of the final
affirmative dumping determination made by the USITC, and since no
injury was currently being done, the United States was obligated to
remove th6 antidumping duties on the importation of farmed Norwegian
Atlantic salmon.'
Once again, the United States refuted this claim by pointing out that
the purpose of antidumping duties is to eliminate the harm being done
prior to their imposition. Therefore, it is to be expected that such harm
would end after their imposition. Such a result, thus, should not justify
the elimination of the duty.'
2. The Panel's Findings on Antidumping Duties
In deciding the merits of Norway's arguments that the initiation of
the antidumping investigation by the United States was improper, the
Panel looked at whether the United States had taken reasonable steps to
confirm that the written petition submitted to start the investigation was
filed "with the authorization or approval of the industry affected."310
The Panel decided that the DOC could rely on the statements in the
petition that the petitioning firms accounted for over 50 percent of the
domestic industry, and could assume, absent express notification that
firms no longer supported the petition, that their support for the petition
continued.3 ' Thus, the Panel concluded that the initiation of the
antidumping investigation was consistent with the United States' obli-
307. d. at 131. Article 9, Duration of Anti-Dumping Duties, of the Article VI
Agreement states, in part: "1. An anti-dumping duty shall remain in force only as long
as, and to the extent necessary to counteract dumping which is causing injury." Article
VI Agreement, supra note 241, art. 9, 31 U.S.T. at 4933, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 18.
308. ADP/87, supra note 238, at 131.
309. Id. A quote from this Report sums up this request: "Apparently, Norway was
arguing that once an order was imposed, it must be removed immediately. This was
absurd on its face." Id.
310. Id. at 146.
311. Id. at 147.
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igations under Article 5:1 of the Article VI Agreement. 12
The Panel then examined the final determination by the United States
that dumping was occurring in light of the United States' obligations
under the Article VI Agreement. The Panel first addressed Norway's
contention that "fair and equitable procedures" must be used by the
United States. It concluded that, since the language relied upon by
Norway was contained in the preamble of the Article VI Agreement and
because the language of the preamble does not "constitute . . . legal
obligation[s] of Parties," Norway's argument was without merit. 313
The Panel then addressed Norway's arguments regarding the amount
of time allotted to the Norwegian respondents to complete the DOC
questionnaire, and the manner in which those responses were verified.
The Panel concluded that, because the DOC had granted extensions to
those requesting them, and accepted corrections from respondents after
the allotted time frame without question, it had acted consistently with
its obligations under Article 6:1 of the Article VI Agreement.314
The next issue the Panel decided concerned the methodology used by
the DOC to determine the existence of dumping. Norway complained
that the United States had used a constructed normal price instead of
using a third-country price comparison. The Panel found that there was
no preferred method outlined or required by the Article VI Agreement.315
This lack of specificity allowed the United States to utilize either
methodology, as it determined appropriate. 6
The Panel then decided whether the United States should use the
price of acquisition of salmon to exporters to determine production costs
or whether the DOC could use the costs of production incurred by
Norwegian farmers in its calculations. It decided in favor of the United
States since the plain language of the Article VI Agreement called for the
use of the cost of production in the country of origin. To use the cost
of acquisition to exporters would be inconsistent with this requirement,1 7
312. Id.
313. Id. at 148. However, the Panel determined that the "fair and equitable
procedures" statement in the Preamble "could guide the Panel's interpretation of the
specific operative provisions of the Agreement." Id. This conclusion was based on
Article 31:2 of the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties. Id.
314. Id. at 151.
315. Id. at 158.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 160-161.
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and would ignore the meaning of the term "cost of production.'318
The DOC's simple averaging of only seven farms to determine the
cost of production was also protested by Norway. The Panel found no
requirement in the Article VI Agreement to use a certain sampling
methodology.319 Because no method was specified, the Panel had to
determine whether the method used was sufficient to determine the cost
of production.'t The Panel concluded that the United States had acted
inconsistently with its obligations under Article 2:4 of the Article VI
Agreement because the DOC had failed to "ensure that these samples
were representative."' It concluded that the DOC had not sufficiently
considered the number of farms that should be sampled to determine the
average cost of production.' In light of this conclusion, the Panel then
had to determine whether the United States had also acted inconsistently
with Article 8:3 of the Article VI Agreement.'
When faced with the above question, the Panel found that it "had no
basis to pronounce itself on what margins of dumping would have
resulted if the United States had not determined those values inconsis-
tently with Article 2:4."' As a result of the Panel's inability to
determine what the dumping margin would have been if the U.S. had
acted consistently with Article 2:4, it concluded that it could not find that
the United States had acted inconsistently with Article 8:3 of the Article
VI Agreement because it could not say that the United States had
necessarily determined an excessive duty margin.'
Norway had also contested the use of a simple average versus a
weighted average to determine the cost of production. Again, the Panel
noted that the Article VI Agreement contained no specific sampling
methodology requirements. Accordingly, it concluded that the United
States had acted reasonably, and within their obligations under Article
2:4 of the Article VI Agreement. 6
The Panel then decided whether the United States could compare an
average, constructed value to individual export prices, given that the
318. Id. at 162.
319. Id. at 164.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 169.
322. Id.
323. Id. See supra note 268.
324. ADP/87, supra note 238, at 170.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 173.
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DOC failed to account for the three different salmon weight categories.'
The Panel determined that the DOC had not properly accounted for the
different weight classes in comparing the average value to export price,
and, therefore, its behavior was inconsistent with Article 2:6 of the
Article VI Agreement."8 However, in examining the U.S. practice of
comparing average normal values to export prices, the Panel found that
Article 2:6 of the Article VI Agreement simply calls for a "fair
comparison" and concluded that the United States had acted consistently
with this provision.329
Norway's third major argument focused on the determination of
injury made by the USITC. Norway had argued that the USITC acted
inconsistently with Article 3 of the Article VI Agreement by incorrectly
considering the effects of the Norwegian imports on the U.S. industry,
and by incorrectly determining a causal relationship between Norwegian
imports and material injury to the U.S. industry.3" In its deliberations,
the Panel determined that its scope of review was limited to discerning
whether the USITC had examined all the relevant facts and had provided
sufficient explanations of how the facts supported its determination."'
Finding that the USITC had properly examined and explained the
relevant facts relating to volume, price, and impact on the domestic
industry, the Panel concluded that the United States lived up to its
obligations under Article 3 of the Article VI Agreement."
The Panel then investigated whether the USITC had properly found
a causal relationship between imports and material injury of the U.S.
industry. The Panel found that the investigating authority did not have
to do a thorough examination of all possible factors injuring the domestic
industry, just on the effects of the allegedly dumped products.333 Stating
that the USITC had sufficiently examined other factors, the Panel found
that the USITC acted within its obligations.3"
The Panel next decided whether the imports were causing injury at
the time of the final USITC determination. It stated that investigating
authorities were not expected to continue to collect data up until the time
327. Id. at 179.
328. Id. at 181.
329. Id. at 184-185.
330. Id. at 185.
331. Id. at 186.
332. Id. at 188, 191, 193-195, 197, 198, 201-202.
333. Id. at 205.
334. Id. at 208.
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of the final determination, as that would undermine other parts of the
Article VI Agreement.335  Therefore, the USITC had acted
appropriately. 336
Given these conclusions, the Panel in sum found that the USITC had
acted within its obligations in imposing an antidumping duty on
Norwegian salmon.3' The Panel also found that the continued imposi-
tion of the antidumping duty was proper. Otherwise, it held, any
effective antidumping duty order would have to be removed immediately
upon its imposition. 8
Thus, the Panel found that the United States acted in general
accordance with its international obligations under the Article VI
Agreement. Although the Panel had a few problems with the methodol-
ogy utilized by the DOC in calculating the margin of dumping, the Panel
"found that in this situation it could not recommend that the Committee
request the United States to revoke the anti-dumping duty order and
reimburse any duties paid or deposited under this order, as requested by
Norway."339 The Panel did recommend that the Committee request the
United States to reconsider its final affirmative determination of
dumping, and to make it consistent with the Panel's findings regarding
Articles 2:4 and 2:6 of the Article VI Agreement. This Panel Report
was adopted by the GATT Council on April 27, 1994.1
3. Conclusion
From the two panel reports, now adopted by the GATT Council and
thereby part of GATT law, it can be concluded that as long as a country:
1) acts reasonably in determining the existence of an injury to its
industries and in determining the existence of a foreign subsidy or
dumping practice; 2) justifies its actions; and 3) does not violate the few
methodologies proscribed by GATTJ, their practice will be held
acceptable under GAIT. This was what happened to the United States.
Because GATT did not prescribe a specific methodology to determine the
335. Id. at 213.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 214-215.
339. Id. at 218.
340. J.E., GAIT Information Division, supra note 237.
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existence of a subsidy or its amount,3 1 to determine whether a domestic
industry was being materially injured, 2 or to determine if the imported
product was being sold at LTFV, 1 3 U.S. practice was found to be
consistent with its international obligations. This lack of specificity
allows countries to implement trade laws which are suitable to their
needs while still being true to the general international trade laws.
The other reason that U.S. trade practice was held to be acceptable
was because the USITC considered alternatives and justified its actions.
If the United States had not at least: 1) considered factors other than the
subject imports; 2) justified its decision that those factors were not the
entire problem; and 3) determined that the imports were a cause,
although not necessarily the primary one, of material injury to a U.S.
industry, it is unlikely that United States practice would have been found
consistent with its international obligations.
IV. CHANGES IN THE ATLANTIC SALMON SUPPLY
OF THE U.S. MARKET
The end result of FAST's petition, and the resulting action taken by
the U.S. government was to give the Maine salmon aquaculture industry
a valuable opportunity to expand. In 1988, Norway held 72 percent of
the U.S. market share for Atlantic salmon, while U.S. producers
controlled 8 percent, and other foreign growers 20 percent (all by
341. Although earlier versions of GATT did not contain a detailed definition of a
subsidy, one was adopted in the Uruguay Round negotiations. Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures, Annex IA: Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods,
reprinted in FINAL TEXTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS INCLUDING THE
AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AS SIGNED ON APRIL 15,
1994 229 (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative ed., 1994). Part I of this agreement
outlines the basic definition of a subsidy. Part II discusses prohibited subsidies; Part III,
actionable subsidies; and Part IV, non-actionable subsidies. Annex I of the agreement
even provides an "Illustrative List of Export Subsidies." Id. at 262.
342. Again, earlier versions of GATT did not contain a detailed methodology for
determining injury, but the new GATT does. The new procedures are contained in
Article 3 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Annex IA: Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods,
reprinted in FINAL TEXTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS INCLUDING THE
AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AS SIGNED ON APRIL 15,
1994 145, 148 (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative ed., 1994).
343. A new refinement to determine dumping is contained in Article 2 of the above
Agreement. Id. at 145.
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weight).' However, by 1990, while Norway's share dropped to 42
percent, the shares of other foreign suppliers, most notably Canada and
Chile, expanded to 51 percent and the U.S. suppliers' share dropped to
7 percent. 45 It is apparent from these figures that Maine did not fully
capitalize on the opportunity presented by the FAST-Norway dispute.
Even so, the actions taken during the dispute reportedly saved the Maine
Atlantic salmon farming industry from extinction.s
Maine's failure to significantly capitalize on the void created by the
removal of Norwegian salmon from the U.S. market is evidenced by data
representing changes in imports and production from 1987 to 1992.
Between 1987 and 1992, Chile increased its exports of fresh and chilled
Atlantic salmon to the United States by about 24,000 percent (see table
1 for import data). Approximately 1,734 percent of this increase
occurred between 1989 and 1992. Canada increased its exports to the
United States by 1,382.20 percent between 1987 and 1992. Approxi-
mately 251 percent of this increase occurred between 1989 and 1992.
Maine did increase its total production of Atlantic salmon between 1987
and 1992, but by only 1,186.97 percent. Between 1989 and 1992,
Maine increased its production by 546.54 percent, an amount greater
than the increase in Canadian imports during that same time. Yet, the
1989 to 1992 comparison figures demonstrate that, although Maine was
able to increase its Atlantic salmon production, its growth was not nearly
as significant as that of Chile, based on percentage increases.
One reason Chilean farmed Atlantic salmon is so abundant in the
United States is because it was effectively eliminated from the EU market
by Norway when Norwegian imports to the United States were severely
restricted. When this happened, Norwegian Atlantic salmon exporters
concentrated their efforts on expanding the EU market.47 In response,
Chile focused the sale of their huge supply of low-priced Atlantic salmon
in the U.S. market.' That action forced U.S. producers to meet Chile's
low price and sell at a loss.3" This caused Washington and Maine
growers to complain that Chile was subsidizing its industry and dumping
344. SCM/153, supra note 10, at 138. These figures are rounded.
345. Id. These figures do not equal 100 percent due to rounding.
346. Personal Interview with Mike Hastings, Director, Maine Aquaculture
Innovation Center (Oct. 14, 1994).
347. Dan Kowalski, Low Prices and Too Much Supply: Fishermen and Farmers
Seek Salmon-Marketing Secrets, NAT'L FISHERMAN, Mar. 1994, at 16, 16.
348. Id.
349. Id.
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the product on the U.S. market.3" The Chileans denied this allegation,
saying that they have no control over market prices, and have developed
efficient operations in ideal conditions.35' Chile suggested that salmon
growers marketing their product in the United States combine their
efforts to design a generic marketing campaign to increase demand for
Atlantic salmon from U.S. consumers instead of engaging in an
expensive legal battle between themselves. 2
The reasons why Maine Atlantic salmon growers did not capitalize
upon the situation presented by the duties on Norway and experience
dramatic growth, like Chile did, are unclear. Norwegian salmon imports
might have already injured the Maine industry to a point where recovery
will now take a long time. There is a three-year production cycle for
growing and harvesting salmon. It is possible that Maine growers, in the
face of curtailed Norwegian imports, have increased the number of
smolts in the water that will be harvestable in one to two years. If this
is true, Maine salmon farmers may yet realize the benefits of their
petition.
Since the elimination of Norway from the U.S. market did little to
significantly improve the standing of the domestic industry, other factors
besides foreign competition must be hindering Atlantic salmon aquacul-
ture in the United States. For example, increased regulation of the
industry has imposed costs on the industry which may have hampered its
growth. The first year the State of Maine's Department of Marine
Resources (DMR) required aquaculturalists to obtain a DMR aquaculture
lease was 199 L" The DMR also instituted much stricter environmental
regulations, and increased the scope of a water quality monitoring
program at that time.3" All of these new programs increased the costs
of fish farming in Maine. They also increased the time required to
obtain new permits to allow the industry to expand. This could be
delaying an increase in growing capacity.
The Maine industry has also been affected by superchilled water.
Superchilled water is being blamed for killing thousands of fish in Maine
350. Id. at 17.
351. Chileans Refute Salmon-Dumping Charge, SEAFOOD Bus., Jan./Feb. 1994, at
33, 33.
352. Id.
353. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 60721-A(B) (West 1992).
354. Id.
94 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:33
and New Brunswick, Canada during the 1992-1993 winter.355 The
superchilled water is thought to be the result of global warming which
has melted the polar ice cap. The melted ice has cooled the surrounding
waters, and is being blamed for reduced crab, lobster, and shrimp
landings in Maine. 356
Another potential problem facing Maine salmon growers is increased
competition from Canada as a result of the North American Free Trade
Agreement. The effects this Agreement have and will have on the
domestic Atlantic salmon farming industry are beyond the scope of this
paper, but warrant study in the future. A global increase in the wild
salmon catch might also have driven down the price of farmed salmon,
making it less profitable, and potentially unprofitable, for U.S. growers
to farm Atlantic salmon. However, with recent developments in the
Pacific U.S. wild salmon harvest, the impact of this type of salmon
product should soon be reduced."
Whatever the cause, the United States has switched from importing
large quantities of Norwegian farmed Atlantic salmon to importing it
from Chile and Canada, in absolute numbers, rather than promoting,
developing, and marketing salmon aquaculture domestically. The reason
that the United States, Maine in particular, was not able to gain a larger
share of the U.S. market after the regulatory actions were imposed upon
Norway, is worthy of further study. Also worthy of further study is the
effect the actions discussed in this paper have had on the price structure
and economic viability of the U.S. Atlantic salmon aquaculture industry,
but that is better left to resource economists.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Before drawing specific conclusions in answer to the four initial
questions posed by this paper, it seems appropriate to make a few
general observations about the role and relevancy of international trade
agreements such as the GATT so as to place these specific conclusions
355. Ken Kelly, Colder Oceans Put the Chill on Northern Fisheries, NAT'L
FISHERMAN, Mar. 1994, at 22, 23.
356. Id.
357. The federal government placed a complete ban, except for limited Indian
fishing, on ocean salmon fishing off the Washington coast, and imposed heavy limits on
catches off Oregon and the northern California coast in 1994. Brad Warren, A $15.7
Million Painkiller for Salmon 'Disaster', NAT'L FISHERMAN, Aug. 1994, at 10, 10.
These restrictions were implemented to protect declining coho and chinook stocks. Id.
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in their proper perspective. While the objective of GATT is to "provide
a secure and predictable international trading environment for the
business community and a continuing process of trade liberalization in
which investment, job creation and trade can thrive,"358 many specific
sovereign rights are relinquished when a country becomes party to
GATT. Each contracting party, however, does retain the right to protect
its industries from unfair foreign competition, primarily through the use
of punitive tariffs, rather than quotas.359 GATT defines how parties will
act toward each other to increase international trade through a prescribed
set of rules which are subject to differing interpretations and which
evolve over time. The rules and penalties agreed upon in GATT are not
overly specific to minimize the sovereignty relinquished by the
contracting parties by signing. In the view of the author, international
agreements such as GATT are frequently vague in certain respects to
entice the largest number of countries to join the agreement, and thereby
be obligated to some standard. These agreements, thus, address some of
the primary concerns of the various countries but they leave objection-
able enforcement standards and obligations to impartial review boards or
other groups established by the treaty to deal with disputes between
signatories, or they are left to the countries themselves.
The vagueness discussed above is evidenced in the outcome of the
two panel reports in the Norwegian salmon case. In both cases, U.S.
trade law and practice was held to be acceptable, not because it was
prescribed by GATT, but because no specific alternative method was
prescribed by GATT. Such an interpretation gives countries a fair
amount of latitude in implementing and enforcing their own trade laws.
As more international trade disputes are addressed by GATT Panels, and
as the text of GATT and its side agreements are refined and expanded,
the vagueness at issue here may be reduced and replaced by more
specific requirements.36
Another observation is that international trade agreements such as
GATT permit national policy pertaining to commerce between two
signatories to be heavily driven by a few affected domestic industries,
rather than by the nation as a whole and/or its populace. This is because
an affected industry in the United States, no matter how small, can
petition the government to initiate an investigation into the alleged unfair
358. GATT: What It Is and What It Does, supra note 39, at 1.
359. Id. at 7-8.
360. This is exactly what the Uruguay Round negotiations have accomplished.
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trade practices of another country. It could be argued that consumers in
the United States, for example, would be required to pay higher prices
for a domestic product that could be supplied at a reduced cost by
foreign industries restrained by the imposition of a duty. By requiring
consumers to pay higher prices for products produced by the domestic
industry, the consumer is forced to support the inefficiencies of the
domestic industry. This can be construed as a form of economic subsidy
to the domestic industry. This, and most types of subsidies, can lead to
national inefficiency due to insufficient competition, and can decrease the
nation's wealth. 61 Although the lack of import duties might result in the
short term dislocation of some segments of the domestic work force, the
author believes that the long term health of a nation's economy is more
important than the prevention of short term hardship.
If a foreign company or industry is selling its product below cost, or
"dumping" the product, it will not be able to maintain that strategy for
long. Eventually, all companies must make a profit to stay in
business.362 If a foreign industry is being subsidized by its government,
that means some other industry is not, since no country has the resources
to subsidize all of its industries for long. Even though the lack of trade
barriers might harm a few domestic industries because they are unable
to produce a quality product at a competitive price, or at least compara-
ble to that of the foreign industry, other domestic industries should be
able to flourish.
In determining the relative competitive positions of industries in
importing and exporting countries in order to determine the appropriate-
ness of a duty, the issue of what exactly constitutes a subsidy arises.
Compensating for a subsidy by imposing a duty is supposed to level the
competitive playing field between the two countries. However, there are
361. In 1776, Adam Smith wrote, "The wealth of nations isn't built by keeping
barriers high to protect jobs. It is created by concentrating on what a country does
best." THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, quoted in Perspective: Free Trade, More Wealth,
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Aug. 3, 1994, at B1. The above article also states that "trade
increases wealth by increasing competition and specialization." See also Bernard M.
Hoekman and Michael P. Leidy, Dumping, Antidumping and Emergency Protection, J.
WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1989, at 27 (saying that antidumping laws reduce competition,
leading to inefficiency); Alan 0. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic
Perspective, 89 COLIJM. L. REv. 199 (1989) (an economic efficiency analysis of
countervailing duty law, advocating for a reform of countervailing duty law).
362. In making this statement, the author is assuming the business is operating to
make money.
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bound to be disputes over what types of governmental actions should be
construed as "subsidies" subject to corrective measures. One area, for
example, which could cause controversy is environmental regulation. If
an industry in an importing country is subject to strict environmental
regulation, which raises production costs and prices, less stringent
environmental regulations in another, exporting, country could possibly
be construed as a subsidy. Different taxation structures and/or tax levels
for activities such as development activities, and differing depreciation
schedules for capital expenditures could also result in varying costs of
production between countries. These "indirect subsidies" might not
normally be considered subsidies, but are of such a nature that perhaps
they should be defined as such in agreements like the GATT. The
definition of "subsidy" was an important topic during the subject dispute.
The lack of such a definition in GATT or its side agreements benefitted
the United States by allowing it to develop its own practice and policy
on the issue.3
Finally, although GATT can provide an avenue for a country to
protect its domestic industries from foreign competition,3  it can not help
domestic industries resolve their problems or become more competitive,
and thus prosper, even within their domestic market. Put another way,
GATT does not and can not require a domestic industry to address or
correct basic deficiencies in how it operates and manages its individual
producers. It merely provides a mechanism to stop or regulate inroads
into the market for the subject product unfairly created in other signatory
countries. This was evidenced in the present investigation. Although
Maine Atlantic salmon growers were able to eliminate their primary
competition from the U.S. market, this action did not significantly help
Maine farmer's own position within the market. If foreign competition
was not and is not now the real problem facing the domestic industry,
duties imposed on foreign competitors will not help.
The case studied in this Article has highlighted some aspects of how
U.S. international trade disputes are settled. In this case, U.S. trade
legislation was held acceptable by two GATT Panels, again, not because
U.S. practice and policy was mandated by GATT provisions, but largely
363. See supra footnotes 233-236 and accompanying text.
364. See, e.g., J. Wesley Bailey, TradeLaw: The Protectionist Use ofAntidumping
Laws-Should the Law Be Changed?, 7 FLA. J. INT'L L. 433 (1992) (saying that
antidumping law is contrary to free trade and the interests of U.S. consumers, but that
the law should be changed to protect important U.S. industries).
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because GATT lacked specific requirements on how countries should
deal with the circumstances involved. While this vagueness is probably
required to entice nations to sign GATT, it also works to lessen the
effectiveness of the requirements which do exist. Because the United
States was the importing country here, and because the GATT was vague
on its requirements, the United States was able to handle the initial
investigations by the USITA and USITC as it wished. It appears that as
long as an importing country's trade laws and practices are reasonable
and thorough, it can do what it wants.
It also appears to the author that the four original questions posed by
this Article have been answered. The four questions were: 1) is U.S.
trade law being used as a protectionist measure to protect U.S. industries
from unfair foreign competition; 2) are U.S. and international trade law
and practice incompatible; 3) did the removal of Norwegian Atlantic
salmon from the U.S. market open the door for other producer countries;
and, 4) was the above opportunity capitalized on by Maine, the initiator
of the event, or by other producer countries, namely Canada and Chile?
With regard to question one, it appears that, in this instance, the
United States did successfully use its trade laws in a protectionistic
manner in an attempt to protect the U.S. salmon industry from what it
believed was unfair foreign competition. However, as stated above, this
author does not believe that dumping or subsidies are necessarily unfair
to the importing country as a whole. This is because foreign products
priced lower than domestically produced products can benefit consumers.
They can also benefit the domestic industry. Competition from foreign
producers will force domestic producers to make their operations more
efficient, which might result in even lower prices to consumers and/or
a better product. The protectionist measures taken in the Norway case
may have prevented this from occurring.
As to question two, although certain minor aspects of U.S. trade
practice were found incompatible with the United States' international
obligations under the GATT, its trade laws and practices as a whole (at
least those relevant here) were found to be consistent with its interna-
tional trade rights and obligations. This conclusion is based on the
conclusions of the two GATT Panel Reports which upheld the United
States' position, determination of injury, and imposition of duties on the
subject imports. Both of these Reports found that it was within the
United States' international rights and obligations to levy duties upon the
subject imports.
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Concerning the third question, import data and Maine production
data shows that other producers were able to enter the U.S. market and
fill the gap left by the removal of Norwegian salmon from the U.S.
market. In 1989 the amount of farmed Atlantic salmon in the United
States market was 20,224,255 kg. By 1992, that amount was 31,539,
300 kg (see table 1 for volume of import data).3" This shows that the
level of farmed Atlantic salmon in the United States actually increased
after the removal of the Norwegian product.
The same data answers the fourth question. Although Maine was
able to increase its annual production of salmon in the years following
the curtailment of Norwegian product in the U.S. market, Chile far
exceeded that increase, based on percentage increase in U.S. imports and
Maine production, and has become the current dominant producer for the
U.S. market (see table 1 for volume of import data). However, Maine
was able to outperform Canada between 1989 and 1992, as discussed
above. Although Maine made inroads, based on percentage increases
between 1989 and 1992, into the U.S. fresh and chilled Atlantic salmon
market, it still lags behind Chile and Canada in absolute terms. This
conclusion is based on import data for foreign countries and production
data for Maine. The reasons for Maine's failure to more significantly
capitalize on the removal of Norwegian salmon from the U.S. market is
unclear from this investigation, but warrants study in the future.
365. 1989 was chosen because it was also chosenby the USITC. 1992 was chosen
because the author believes the reliability of 1992 data are better than 1991 data, due to
how data are collected and reported by the Census Bureau.

